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3Preface
With the advent of improved understanding and increased characterisation of 
severe accidents, management of them should be analysed as an integrated 
complex process. The interrelationship of emergency operating procedures, 
severe accident management guidelines, and nuclear power plant (NPP) 
emergency off-site actions should be planned and organized to minimize the 
consequences of such accidents, considered over the whole spectrum of their 
possibilities and probabilities, within the limits of practicality. A deterministic 
approach, coupled with both probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) 
methodology and PSA results, can play significant roles in the development of 
relevant utility, regulatory and all stakeholders policies.
This document describes the background, objectives and current state of a 
corresponding activity within JRC-IE's Analysis and Management of Nuclear 
Accidents (AMA) Action on benchmarking and harmonising strategic planning 
practices for emergency zoning and disseminating information to the public, 
based on a risk-informed decision making approach. 
This activity is expected to complement - in terms of probabilistic aspects - 
current JRC-IE activities on traditional deterministic safety assessment of 
NPPs and other energy systems.
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8EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Within the Institute for Energy (IE) of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission (EC), located at Petten, The Netherlands, an activity 
on Benchmarking and Harmonising Strategic Planning Practices for 
Emergency Zoning and Information to the Public  is in progress within the 
framework of the JRC FP-6 Action Nr. 3131 "Analysis and Management of 
Nuclear Accidents" (AMA).
The objective of this project is to identify the corresponding relevant 
information currently used on the basis of either Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA) or other sources, to document the current status of 
defining NPP risk zones and to specify relevant information to the public from 
as many different European and other countries as possible. Another, rather 
long-term objective related to this JRC project is to agree - together with the 
developers and owners of this information - on a harmonised template to 
publish corresponding results to different stakeholders, including the public, at 
a European level.
Level 3 PSA methodology can, in principle, be used to estimate the offsite 
consequences of severe accidents and could provide an acceptable basis for 
implementation of the probabilistic approach to emergency planning. Besides, 
the outcomes could be used as information source for European NPP risk 
mapping. For these purposes, examples of the most relevant data would be: 
x Evacuation notification time1;
x Total early fatalities; 
x Total late fatalities; 
x The amount of radiation the individuals receive depending on the 
distance from the plant; 
x The most frequent wind direction; 
x Economic losses, etc. 
Considerable experience has been gained during the past years regarding 
severe accident risk assessment and mitigation, mainly in the USA. Prediction 
of environmental impacts of severe accidents (in the form of probability-
weighted consequences) was performed for all NPPs and the risk reduction 
potential was identified using severe accident mitigation alternatives. These 
activities are being performed mainly within the license renewal process of the 
plants. In addition, the future risk is calculated for the extended lifetimes.
Based on the information obtained, significant differences have been found in 
the definitions of Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) of the NPPs in different 
1
 Two of the three fission product boundaries have failed and the failure of the third boundary 
is likely; the time depends on the initiating event and the PSA can predict it.
9countries within the EU and beyond. The approach to emergency planning is, 
in general, very strongly deterministic. The usual approach is that a reference 
accident has been defined (usually Design Basis Accident) to be used as 
basis for drawing up the emergency plans.
In EU Member States, the practical application of Level 2 PSA results for the 
accident management is very limited and, effectively, very little risk-based 
information is used. In the course of this project, only the Czech Republic and 
the UK informed about some cases where Level 2 PSA results were used in a 
formal way as an input to emergency arrangements. The UK is the only 
Member State of the EU, which has been carrying out research to consider 
how Level 2 PSA outcomes could be used in a systematic way for emergency 
planning purposes. 
The benefits from this project are:
1) a better understanding of important issues in PSA applications to risk-
informed supporting of emergency zoning in relation to NPP accident 
management,
2) a better knowledge on the actual use of various current approaches 
and methods in the area, and
3) information on the efforts undertaken by utilities, regulatory authorities 
and other stakeholders to explore possibilities and means of using 
probabilistic approaches for this topic.
The resulting knowledge should help regulatory authorities, civil protection 
institutions, European institutions such as EC services, various PSA users 
and developers and, last but not least, the general public to get a clear picture 
on the relevance of the issue, the consistency of current approaches and on 
related research and development (R&D) needs. 
The original hypothesis for this project consisted in the view that PSA is 
currently already mature enough to be used also for NPP emergency risk 
zoning. However, at present it can be stated that not much is being done in 
application of Level 2-3 PSA results for emergency planning in EU Member 
States. As a next step, JRC approached a large number of PSA experts on 
the one side and emergency planning/radiation protection experts on the other 
side to ask whether incorporation of risk-informed support into NPP 
emergency planning is currently a relevant enough topic to be treated by a 
technical seminar with a view of international harmonisation or is the topic 
somewhat premature at the present stage.
JRC-IE received a large number of very positive responses, only a few ones 
being reserved or sceptical. While this is certainly not an exhaustive feedback, 
it was nevertheless found reasonable to organise a JRC seminar on 
"Emergency & Risk Zoning around NPPs", which will be held on 26–27 April 
2005 in Petten, The Netherlands (see Appendix C). The seminar will provide 
an opportunity for sharing of experience in the field on both good practice and 
identification of problem areas, incl. comparison to other major-hazardous 
industries, such as the chemical process industries. Based on the outcome of 
this seminar, possible follow-up R&D actions, e.g. in the form of an 
international Working Group could be envisaged.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Emergency planning zones (EPZs) around NPPs are, in general, defined on a 
deterministic basis. They help to plan a strategy for protective actions during 
an emergency. The exact size and shape of each EPZ is a result of detailed 
planning which includes consideration of the specific conditions at each site, 
unique geographical features of the area and demographic information.
Predetermined protection action plans are in place for an EPZ and designed 
to avoid or reduce doses from potential ingestion of radioactive materials. 
These actions include sheltering, evacuation, use of stabile iodine tablets in 
the short term, food bans, relocation and decontamination in the longer term.
There are significant differences in EU Member States in the way how 
emergency plans have been drawn up and how EPZs have been defined. 
Usually simplified deterministic approaches are used.
Based on the state-of-the-art developments and achievements in application 
of PSA technology, the original hypothesis that triggered this project consisted 
in the view that PSA is currently already mature enough to be used also for 
NPP emergency risk zoning. This resulted in the long term objective of this 
JRC project to agree - together with the developers and owners of this 
information - on a harmonised template to publish corresponding results to 
different stakeholders, including the public, at a European level. 
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2. BACKGROUND: CURRENT NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES &
RELEVANCE OF THE ISSUE
The 1995-2000 activity programs of the Nuclear Regulators Working Group 
(NRWG) and the Reactor Safety Working Group (RSWG) of the EC were 
carried out within the framework of the 1975 and 1992 resolutions of the 
Council of Ministers on the technological problems of nuclear safety 2.
The 1975 resolution called for ”... progressive harmonisation of safety 
requirements and criteria in order to provide for an equivalent and satisfactory 
degree of protection of the population and of the environment against the risk 
of radiation resulting from nuclear activities …”. The 1995 Consensus 
Document on the safety of European Light Water Reactors (LWR) noted that 
”... harmonisation begins with the identification of convergences and the 
assessment of divergences based on synthesis studies resulting from an 
intensive exchange of information of the actual practices in the different 
Member States”. 
In 1993, the EC established a contract with a Consortium of European 
Technical Support Organisations (TSOs) in order to arrive at common views 
on technical safety issues related to large evolutionary Pressurised Water 
Reactors (PWR) in Europe, which could be ready for operation during the next 
decade. The TSOs involved were: AVN (Belgium) (Technical project leader), 
AEA Technology (United Kingdom), ANPA (Italy), CIEMAT (Spain), GRS 
(Germany) and IPSN (France). The general objective of the European TSO 
Study Project on Development of a Common Safety Approach in the EU for 
Large Evolutionary Pressurised Water Reactors [2] was to develop, through a 
collaboration of EU TSOs, a common safety approach to issues related to 
large evolutionary PWRs in Europe, which could be ready for operation during 
the next decade. The TSO study represented an important step forward in the 
development of a common approach of the TSOs to the safety of advanced 
evolutionary PWRs. This goal was mainly achieved by an in-depth analysis of 
the key safety issues, taking into account new developments in the national 
technical safety objectives.
After careful considerations, and on the basis of the survey of advanced PWR 
concepts in preparation for the consolidated analysis, a list of 12 key issues 
was finally prepared and selected for in-depth analysis. These selected key 
issues, listed below (those key issues of the list, which are in close relation to 
the report in hand, are printed in bold), were judged to have the greatest 
safety significance: 
x Use of PSA in design and licensing; 
x Reduced environmental source term and emergency plan; 
2 http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/nuclear/safety/index_en.htm
13
x Identification of postulated initiating events (PIEs) and associated 
acceptance criteria; 
x Instrumentation and control systems important for safety (hardware and 
software aspects); 
x System architecture; 
x Passive systems behaviour; 
x Practical elimination of core melt in shutdown states with open 
containment;
x Practical elimination of high pressure core melt; 
x Practical elimination of core melt with containment bypass; 
x Practical elimination of large early releases resulting from 
containment failure; 
x Mitigation of low pressure core melt and vessel melt-through; 
x Identification of severe accidents: methodology and acceptance 
criteria.
For all the key issues considered in the European TSO Study, conclusions 
have been developed covering the state of knowledge, safety approaches, 
and the approaches taken in selected reactor designs. In addition, TSO group 
positions have been formulated regarding the development of a common
approach for each key safety issue, highlighting any studies still to be done in 
order to reach the required common understanding and consensus. These 
common positions formed the major achievement of the TSO study project. 
Areas in which further work was felt to be needed include [2]: 
x PSA methods and use; 
x In-containment source term and radiological releases; 
x Application of the Single Failure Criterion (SFC) and maintenance; 
consideration;
x Reliability of passive systems; 
x Containment by-pass; 
x Hydrogen risk, no occurrence of deflagration to detonation transition; 
x Strategies for corium coolability; 
x Demonstration of practical elimination of selected sequences; 
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x Qualification of systems for severe accidents.
In summary, an important step forward has been made in the development of 
a common safety approach of the TSOs. This was mainly achieved by an in-
depth analysis of the key safety issues.  The above lists of key issues and of 
areas for further work clearly indicate that risk-informed support of emergency 
zoning for NPPs, harmonisation of strategic planning practices and 
information to the public are of high relevance.
A further argument for moving towards more risk-informed approaches comes 
from the common practices in another high-risk industrial sector, the chemical 
process industry: Although in the process industry the probabilistic approach 
to risk assessment is certainly less complete and consistent as compared to 
the nuclear industry, risk-informed results are nevertheless used in many 
countries for land use planning (risk / emergency zoning) purposes. Land use 
planning is a legal requirement in the EU under the so-called Seveso II 
Directive ("Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards")3 and 
risk-informed methods are encouraged in the practical implementation of the 
Directive. Then why is current practice in the nuclear sector with its large 
number of high-quality PSAs seemingly quite different? Is it entirely due to the 
uncertainties that are still related to PSAs? Is it necessary to first proceed 
towards more PSA harmonisation, e.g. by development of PSA standards and 
quality templates, before more risk-informed approaches are used for risk and 
emergency zoning? Or is there the danger of loss of trust and credibility when 
being reluctant to compare current practices with more risk-informed 
approaches?
3 http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/seveso/index.htm
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3. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
Plant-specific PSA can provide together with other information resources 
relevant information for strategic planning purposes in the area of emergency 
zoning (risk zones) around a NPP and information to the public on the 
geographical component of its risk.
The general objectives of this project are:
x to identify what is the corresponding relevant information currently used 
on the basis of either PSA or other information sources,
x to document the current status together with concrete examples of NPP 
risk zones, and
x to specify information to the public from as many different European 
and other countries as possible which could be published at a 
European level (preparatory steps towards development of 
corresponding consensus).
The more detailed objectives are:
x To analyse how information from plant-specific PSA studies is currently 
used in different countries / NPPs for providing a decision-making basis 
for emergency / risk zoning around a NPP and how information is 
disseminated to the public.
x To collect and document corresponding examples from as many 
different European and other countries as possible.
x To agree together with the developers and owners of this information 
on a harmonised template to publish corresponding results to different 
stakeholders, including the public, at a European level. Where 
consensus on publication of information at a European level cannot be 
achieved, it is essential to clearly document the “sensitivities” of 
individual countries / stakeholders in terms of data confidentiality. 
Criteria to come to a corresponding European consensus are the 
relevance of the information (sufficient level of detail), its easily 
understandable character and the acceptability for publication by the 
national authorities in terms of different national legislation, values and 
habits. The mechanism to come to this consensus is consultation of 
experts from designated contact points in the participating countries 
and analysis of related legislation as well as of plant-specific PSAs and 
other information resources used.
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4. RISK-INFORMED DECISION-MAKING
One of the key challenges in truly risk-informed decision-making (RIDM) is the 
reconciliation of PSA results and insights with traditional deterministic safety 
analysis. This is particularly true when it comes to defense in depth and safety 
margins. PSA results often conflict with deterministic insights. If a method of 
reconciling these conflicts is not defined, then RIDM can become deterministic 
assessment, along with PSA. This results in PSAs being an additional layer of 
requirements rather than a tool for optimised decision-making. Alternatively, if 
PSA information is always used to override deterministic considerations, then 
this is a ‘risk-based’ approach, not a 'risk-informed' one [3]. 
There is a general agreement that RIDM has the potential [4] to contribute 
towards maintaining and improving nuclear safety. It can complement the 
deterministic approach to nuclear safety and maintain the concepts of defence 
in depth and adequate safety margins. However, risk-informed decision-
making is a broader concept than just the use of PSA [5]. RIDM uses the 
results of PSA as one input to the decision-making process, but allows for 
consideration of other factors, in particular aspects of safety management and 
safety culture. At present these aspects are included in PSA only to the extent 
that they are reflected in the plant-specific data used, but they are not 
explicitly modelled in PSAs. RIDM is a process, which can be used by the 
utility and the regulator, and provides the framework for risk-informed 
regulation. The objective is to enhance regulatory effectiveness, using risk 
information to optimise nuclear safety regulations by eliminating regulatory 
requirements that are shown to be unnecessary in the light of this information, 
and thus to reduce regulatory burdens.
Whether risk-informed regulation is of benefit to utilities depends to a large 
extent on the common understanding developed with the regulatory 
authorities. Since the preparation of a PSA imposes a considerable burden, in 
terms of the human and financial resources that need to be expended, it is of 
utmost importance to define clearly what is expected from the utility and how 
the results will be used. This common understanding can be developed in a 
dialogue that includes all stakeholders. RIDM will strengthen the perception 
that the operator is assuming the primary responsibility for safe operation.
RIDM in areas that affect licensee requirements necessitates review (and, 
ultimately, approval) of PSAs and supporting information by the regulatory 
body. A suitable regulatory framework and regulatory staff with considerable 
technical capabilities in the areas of PSA and risk-informed decision-making 
are prerequisites for such review and approval. This constitutes a 
considerable burden for countries with small nuclear programmes and limited 
numbers of regulatory staff.
It is necessary to ensure the availability of high quality PSAs to support RIDM. 
The meaning of ‘high quality’ in this context can vary and is defined as being 
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commensurate with the intended use. Several IAEA as well as EU Member 
States have developed national PSA guidelines, and the IAEA has prepared 
guidance on "PSA Quality for Applications" at the international level [6]. An 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has developed standard 
on PSA [7, 8]. Additional efforts to promote the production of high quality 
PSAs include peer reviews, establishment of user groups for similar type of 
plants, pooling of data and preparation of reference PSAs.
RIDM can be successful only if all stakeholders understand the process and 
the results obtained. The general public is an important stakeholder and it is 
necessary to find ways of communicating the results of RIDM to them.
In addition to the main nuclear regulatory body, a licensee has to deal with 
several other regulatory organizations, e.g. those responsible for 
environmental protection. If the concept of RIDM is not shared by these other 
authorities, this might complicate the decision-making process. Thus, 
consistency between the approaches followed by different authorities will be 
beneficial.
Although there are ongoing developments of systems to help support 
decision-making in emergency situations and for emergency planning 
(especially for emergency zoning around NPP) and some of these tools may 
use data obtained from the PSA, it is expected that the PSA itself would not 
be consulted to support the emergency response during an accident. With the 
accident in progress, the probabilistic nature of the PSA is not readily 
applicable and the data and methods are not in a rapidly accessible format. 
For efficiency and usefulness, the understanding of the range of outcomes 
from various events and actions and the impact of the different 
countermeasures should be or should already have been taken into 
consideration in the development of the pre-established NPP emergency plan 
[9].
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5. PSA to SUPPORT EMERGENCY PLANNING
PSA of a NPP provides a comprehensive, structured approach to identifying 
failure scenarios and deriving numerical estimates of the risks to plant staff 
and members of the public as well. PSAs are normally performed at the 
following three levels [10]: 
Level 1 PSA, which identifies the sequences of events that can lead to core 
damage, estimates core damage frequency (CDF) and provides insights into 
the strengths and weaknesses of the safety systems and procedures provided 
to prevent core damage. 
Level 2 PSA, which identifies the ways in which radioactive releases from 
NPP can occur and estimates their magnitudes and frequencies. This analysis 
provides additional insights into the relative importance of accident prevention 
and mitigation measures such as reactor containment. 
Level 3 PSA, which estimates public health and other societal risks such as 
contamination of land or food. 
PSA provides a systematic approach to determining whether safety systems 
are adequate, the plant design balanced, the defence in depth requirement 
have been realized and the risk as low as reasonably achievable. These are 
characteristics of the probabilistic approach, which distinguish it from the 
deterministic approach. To date, PSA have been performed for more than 200 
NPPs worldwide and are under various stages of development for most of the 
remaining NPPs. All of them have been done to Level 1 to provide an 
estimate of the core damage frequency for initiating events occurring during 
full power operation. Many of them also estimate the contribution to the risk, 
which would arise during low power and shutdown conditions. In some cases, 
the analysis has been extended to consider how the sequences would 
progress after core damage has occurred. This is often termed a Level 1+ 
(Level 1 plus) PSA, although the exact meaning of this varies from country to 
country.
However, the emerging standard in the past few years is for Level 2 PSAs to 
be carried out. A review of the use and development of PSA in OECD NEA 
member countries carried out by the OECD Committee on the Safety of 
Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and Working Group on Risk Assessment 
(WGRisk) in 2002 [11] provided details of the current status of PSA 
programmes including guidelines, various PSA applications, major results in 
recent studies and research and development topics. 
The above-mentioned PSAs have been conceived for a wide variety of 
reasons, which include the following fully or partly relevant ones in terms of 
the present document: 
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x To provide insights from risk analyses to supplement those obtained 
from deterministic safety assessments; 
x To estimate the risk from plants for comparison with the risk criteria; 
x To address the phenomena that would occur during core damage and 
provide insights into how a plant would behave during a severe 
accident;
x To identify weaknesses in the level of protection provided for severe 
accidents;
x To identify additional safety systems and accident management 
measures that would provide further protection against severe 
accidents;
x To provide an input into emergency preparedness.
The state-of-the-art is to have a full scope Level 2 PSA (including external 
events and low power and shutdown) that is maintained as a ‘living PSA’ with 
regular updating. Modern computer technology allows frequent recalculations 
of the PSA to evaluate the impact of changes in operation or design and 
allows use of the PSA in various applications. There is a general agreement, 
as documented in various IAEA Safety Standards, that the deterministic 
approach to nuclear safety should be complemented by a probabilistic 
approach.
Though PSAs have been used extensively in the past, their use was usually 
limited to a variety of applications on a case-by-case basis as deemed 
necessary or useful. There is now a recent development, led by the USA and 
followed by several other countries, to move to a much expanded use of PSA 
in what is termed ‘risk-informed decision-making’ (see chapter 3). The main 
driving force behind this movement is the expectation that the use of risk 
insights can result in both improved safety and a reduction in unnecessary 
regulatory requirements, hence leading to a more efficient use of resources 
for NPP operators and the regulatory authority.
Historically, the use of probabilistic approaches for nuclear safety has always 
been more common in countries such as Argentina, Canada, The 
Netherlands, South Africa, UK and the USA as well as in some Scandinavian 
countries. Probabilistic considerations are also part of the IAEA international 
safety standards, e.g. the General Nuclear Safety Objective is defined in [12] 
as: “to protect individuals, society and the environment from harm by 
establishing and maintaining in nuclear installations effective defence against 
radiological hazards.” This is supplemented by two complementary Safety 
Objectives related to radiation protection and technical aspects. The Technical 
Safety Objective requires one “to take all reasonably practical measures to 
prevent accidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate their consequences
should they occur; to ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all 
possible accidents taken into account in the design of the installation, 
including those of very low probability, any radiological consequences would 
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be minor and below prescribed limits; and to ensure that the likelihood of 
accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely low”. It is 
specified that “a safety analysis of the plant design shall be conducted in 
which methods of both deterministic and probabilistic analysis shall be 
applied”.
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) issued, in its 
International Standards No. 61508 [13] and No. 300-3-9 [14], dealing with the 
requirements for risk analysis and functional safety analysis of technological 
systems and specifying the scope of the analysis in general. They intend to 
provide guidelines for selecting and implementing techniques for risk 
assessment of technological systems. The objective of these standards is to 
ensure quality and consistency in the planning and execution of risk analyses 
and the presentation of results and conclusions.
There is international consensus that application of PSA can provide an in-
depth understanding of the level of safety (mitigation of initiating events, 
prevention of core melt accidents and mitigation of severe accidents) 
achieved in design. It should be viewed as a complementary, additional tool in 
safety analysis that improves safety-related decision-making. PSA is not and 
cannot be a wholesale replacement of traditional safety methods or 
philosophies. From this document point of view, PSA has been found useful, 
among other recognised reasons because it provides a common 
understanding of the problem, thus facilitating communication among various 
stakeholder groups, and is an integrated approach, thus identifying the needs 
for contributions from diverse disciplines such as the engineering and the 
social and behavioural sciences [15].
The publication of the Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 and subsequent 
conducted NPP PSAs had a tremendous impact on the thinking of nuclear 
safety experts. Two major insights from WASH-1400 were [16]:
x Prior thinking was that (no quantified) frequency of severe core 
damage was extremely low and the consequences of such damage 
would be catastrophic. The WASH-1400 calculated a Core Damage 
Frequency (CDF) in the order of 10-4 to 10-5 per reactor-year, a much 
higher number than anticipated, and showed that the consequences 
would not always be catastrophic.
x A significant failure path for radioactivity release that bypasses the 
containment building was identified. Traditional safety analysis 
methods had failed to do so.
This application of PSAs to operating plants has provided modelling 
techniques and quantification tools that are sufficiently proven and allow use 
of PSA for plant-specific decision-making (e.g. use of PSA in design and 
licensing for future PWRs, [2]).
There is an international consensus on a qualitative safety objective, which is 
to reduce the risk of accidental releases of radioactivity as compared to 
existing reactors, including severe accidents. To achieve this objective, in 
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establishing additional requirements, even for Design Basis Accidents (DBA), 
Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA) and other multiple failure situations, 
the PSA results should be used as a design input. Implementation of this 
approach should lead to the achievement, as stated in INSAG-3 [15], of a 
CDF less than 10-5 per reactor operating year to be considered for future 
reactors as a reference value. This value, as well as in some cases an 
objective for large early release frequency (LERF) of less than 10-6 per reactor 
operating year is in common use currently.
The scope of the design stage PSA should cover sequences leading to core 
melt (Level 1) and include a probabilistic assessment of the containment 
performance for core damage situations (Level 2). Besides, all operating 
states, including low power level and shutdown states should be analysed. 
Further, to overcome the generally known weaknesses in the use of PSA as a 
decision-making tool, it is advisable to use, among other, the following 
principles:
x Maintain deterministic criteria for design of safety systems in case of 
DBAs, supplemented by probabilistic requirements. In this case the 
PSA can help in achieving a balanced design and in evaluation of the 
different modes of operation, such as low power level/shutdown states. 
x Establish requirements for BDBAs using a realistic approach and PSA 
insights, to identify the need for additional system requirements 
including redundancy and diversity in safety-related systems. 
Nevertheless, deterministic criteria should be applied where there 
would be uncertainties in the phenomenology of these situations or of 
operating conditions, such as for the containment design to cope with 
core melt sequences. These criteria should be established to ensure a 
safety margin to cover uncertain phenomena. The results of R&D 
programmes could help to rationalize the requirements, progressively 
adjusting the design in light of the results of the validated calculations, 
so eliminating safety margins shown to be unnecessary. That is why 
the report [1] supports the continuation of R&D programmes with the 
objective of obtaining better knowledge of severe accident phenomena.
x Define a coherent and harmonised methodology and acceptance 
criteria for the use of PSA for various relevant applications.
It shall be mentioned that the development of a common approach for 
application of PSA during the licensing process is much more difficult than for 
the design process. This results from the current differing balances between 
probabilistic and deterministic approaches within existing national regulatory 
environments. Some countries have a largely deterministic framework, where 
PSA is used mostly as a method to check and evaluate the design. Others 
base their regulation ultimately on demonstrating tolerable risk to society, 
where probabilistic criteria have to play significant part in demonstrating the 
justification of a plant’s acceptability, although these are underpinned by the 
need to demonstrate that some deterministic engineering principles are being 
followed in the design. These positions are not mutually exclusive, however, 
they are difficult to accommodate within a single methodology. 
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In conclusion, the common international approach to the further improvement 
of NPP safety is a well-balanced combination of the deterministic approach 
and the use of PSA as a complementary tool.
5.1   NPP Safety Management  
Safety management of the NPPs is a relatively new concept that builds on the 
experience gained from the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. It 
incorporates insights derived from severe accidents research programs now 
at various levels of completion. Fortunately, serious nuclear accidents are 
very rare. As a result, there is very little practical experience with emergency 
response to a reactor accident.
Basically, safety management is divided into three parts: 
x Accident management; 
x Emergency management;
x Risk management.
Accident management combines elements of plant design and operating 
configuration with operator guidelines and procedures to optimize the 
capabilities of preventing, arresting the progress, or mitigating the 
consequences of potentially severe accidents.
Emergency management has to protect the public from the effects of actual 
release of radioactive material from a NPP. Successful accident-management 
strategies reduce the need to implement emergency plans. Emergency 
planning generally refers to the development of plans to keep the radiological 
consequences of an accident below specified limits. For NPPs, both onsite 
and offsite emergency response plans are required. This is because a severe 
accident at NPP could impact individuals located some distance away from 
the power plant. Planning encompasses organization, notification procedures, 
emergency facilities and equipment, and training. Emergency preparedness 
generally refers to readiness of a nuclear plant staff and government 
authorities to implement the plan when needed. Accident management 
interfaces with emergency management in the NPP control room. The 
operating crew keeps the plant under control. However, the same crew 
initiates the execution of emergency plans.
Regarding risk management, risk is a quantitative measure of accident loss 
potential in terms of both the event likelihood and consequences. Likelihood is 
determined in terms of either frequency (how often can this happen) or 
probability (what are the chances this will happen). Consequences are 
expected effects from the accident, usually measured in terms of health 
impact, property damage and environmental impact.
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Fig. 5.1 shows the relationships among accident management, emergency 
management and risk management [17]. Although there are some obvious 
overlaps and multiple interfaces, distinctions are reasonably clear.
Fig. 5.1 Relationship among accident management, emergency management 
              and risk management. 
Risk management comprises the analyses, decisions and actions that are 
designed to minimize risk. Documented risk analysis forms the technical basis 
for risk-management decisions and actions. Risk management focuses on the 
possibilities of an accident; accident management deals primarily with the 
realities of the moment. Risk management is successful if it reduces the need 
for both accident management and emergency management.
In the next part of this chapter, a more detailed description is given for all 
three parts of safety management. 
5.2   Radioactive Release Management within Accident 
Management 
Management of radioactive releases is, together with management of 
pressure vessel and containment, a part of accident management. Once the 
containment has failed, the safety objective is to mitigate the fission product 
release. This objective can be achieved by controlling dispersed fission 
products, suspended fission products in the containment atmosphere, and 
fission products residing in water and by increasing retention time. Explicit 
mechanisms have been identified that contribute to the transport of fission 
products to the containment. These include flow-through power operated relief 
valves (PORVs) or safety relief valves, primary system piping boundary 
failure, and vessel bottom head failure. There is not a great deal that can be 
done in the case of dispersion due to primary boundary failure. A possible 
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measure, feasible for small breaks, is to direct some of the primary coolant 
through the PORVs to the quench tank. Adverse consequences, such as 
possible acceleration of core damage, would have to be assessed before 
initiating this measure.
The release of fission products outside the containment can be caused by 
isolation failure, steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), and interfacing loss of 
coolant accidents (LOCA) outside the containment. If the re-isolation attempts 
failed as a result of equipment failure or the inability to isolate the leak, 
depressurization of the containment would result in a reduction of driving 
forces across the leak. Further measures to consider include containment 
spray systems and strategies to ensure that fission products in the 
containment water remain inside.
Control of fission products in the containment atmosphere means managing 
aerosol and gaseous dispersion. A range of measures have been considered: 
spray systems, chemical additives, filters, chemically reactive materials such 
as charcoal beds, or increased surface areas or cold surfaces to promote 
plate-out and condensation. Conservative assessments indicate, for instance, 
that the aerosol concentration in the containment atmosphere will decline by 
four to five orders of magnitude within a 5-day period.
Nuclear installations are sited, designed, constructed, commissioned, 
operated, and decommissioned according to strict requirements and 
regulations. They have been developed to protect the health and safety of 
plant personnel and the public. Despite these precautions, the possibility of an 
accident leading to a nuclear emergency cannot be excluded entirely. Such 
emergency might result in the release of radioactive material to the 
environment and the exposure of plant personnel. The release of radioactive 
material might also have potential consequences for the general public and for 
property outside the nuclear installation. Therefore, the on-site and off-site 
emergency actions have to be planned in advance that might be necessary to 
mitigate such consequences.
No operating license for a NPP will be issued unless a finding is made by the 
nuclear regulatory authority that there is reasonable assurance that adequate 
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency. In other words, an operating license will be granted only if 
adequate emergency plans have been developed.
The proper response to an emergency requires an understanding of the 
hazards. A plan can provide the right people with the information they need to 
respond properly during an emergency. When available, the results of the 
Level 2 and Level 3 PSA would provide the most important information in this 
area.
To develop an emergency plan, several bases of knowledge are required. The 
three principal bases of knowledge are knowledge of phenomena, plant 
knowledge, and human factors knowledge. Understanding of degraded core 
behaviour, containment phenomena, and fission product behaviour have 
particular importance in emergency plans to manage severe accidents. Such 
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knowledge is available from studies and evaluations of severe accident 
sequences. The plant-specific PSA studies are important source of 
information. They indicate how the plant would respond physically to accident-
initiating events and to subsequent automatic and manual actions.
Plant knowledge refers the existence and status of plant systems, their 
associated controls, and their accessibility and operability under design-basis 
and severe accident conditions. Plant knowledge information represents the 
means by which operators respond to accidents. This information can be 
given in the form of a systems analysis or a set of plant drawings and 
descriptions, or it may exist only in the minds of plant personnel.
Human-factors knowledge provides ways to identify the steps that have to be 
performed and the decisions that have to be made. It has impact on 
probability of success and how those steps can be put to the form of written 
procedures or other appropriate guidance in the best way.
Emergency planning consists of the development of strategies to protect the 
public in situations of severe reactor accident. The reason for developing 
these strategies is that during the first hours of an accident at an NPP, critical 
decisions may be necessary for actions to protect the public; moreover, 
balanced protective actions will be required in the long term.
During the first few hours of an accident at a NPP, plant conditions are major 
determining factors in developing early protective action recommendations. 
The plant operator is responsible for mitigating the consequences of an 
accident and for recommending to off-site authorities protective actions that 
are commensurate with the severity of the accident. These public officials are 
responsible for making decisions on the actions necessary to protect the 
public and for transmitting these decisions to the public.
The regulatory body responsible for the plant shall monitor the actions of the 
plant operations staff and may provide guidance, recommendations and 
advice concerning the protective actions to both the operators and public 
officials. The plant operator and public officials would use such guidance in 
developing their emergency plans and implementing procedures.
The basic premise in emergency planning, and this is supported by PSA 
results, is that in the unlikely event of a severe core damage accident, plant 
operators cannot predict with certainty the occurrence of a radiological 
release, the magnitude and duration of any such release, or the radiological 
consequences of the release. The protective actions must be taken in light of 
these uncertainties, i.e. knowing the possible range of risks. As stated in 
IAEA-TECDOC-1200 Applications of PSA for NPPs [10], most emergency 
plans in IAEA Member States were originally developed on the basis of 
release and dispersal calculations for a selected set of postulated accidents. 
This obviously applies also for EU Member States.
A major effort has been undertaken for about 25 years to obtain a better 
understanding of fission product transport and release mechanisms in LWRs 
under accident conditions, including severe accidents. The state of knowledge 
26
today is such that conservative and rather conservative assumptions can be 
abandoned in favour of best estimate assumptions and models, coupled with 
sensitivity analysis. Current practices for DBAs still make large use of 
deterministic assumptions and models. Nevertheless, a general trend is 
application of realistic assumptions and methods, similarly to what is generally 
applied in the field of severe accidents. For DBAs appropriate margins must 
be included in the assumptions and models to account for the uncertainties in 
the predictions [2].
A main safety objective for the next generation of NPPs is to significantly 
reduce the possibility of significant radioactive releases to the environment, 
even in the case of core melt accidents, so that only very limited protective 
actions are required in area and time [2]. This is also in agreement with 
GPR/RSK proposal [18], the reference to that is taken from the European 
TSO Study [2].
To achieve the general safety objective described above, the main strategy, 
as proposed by GPR/RSK and follow-up formally approved by the safety 
authorities of France and Germany for next generation of plants, is to 
"practically eliminate" severe accident sequences which could lead to large 
early releases and to substantially improve the containment function for all 
other severe accident sequences, so that the off-site release objectives are 
met. A situation is considered practically eliminated if it is physically 
impossible or if proper design provisions are taken to make it extremely 
unlikely with a high degree of confidence. "Practical elimination” of severe 
accident sequences which could lead to large early releases means that, 
concerning these sequences, when they cannot be considered as physically 
impossible, sufficient design and operation provisions have been taken so that 
these sequences can be considered as extremely unlikely with a high degree 
of confidence. The demonstration would be provided through deterministic 
and/or probabilistic means.
The European TSO study [2] also made use of the requirements developed by 
the European utilities and takes advantage of the recommendations made by 
the French and German nuclear safety advisory groups: “Groupe Permanent 
chargé des Réacteurs nucléaires” and "Reaktorsicherheitskommission" 
(GPR/RSK). The study agrees with the GPR/RSK position, concerning the 
radiological consequences of low pressure core melt accidents (the 
sequences leading to early containment failure having been "practically 
eliminated”), that ”… the associated maximum conceivable release would 
necessitate only very limited protection measures in area and in time. These 
would be expressed by no permanent relocation, no need for emergency 
evacuation outside the immediate vicinity of the plant, limited sheltering, and 
no long term restrictions in consumption of food. Calculations of potential 
radiological consequences shall take into account realistic assumptions and 
parameters. … due to the wide range of potential accident conditions in 
severe accident situations, the achievement of this objective has to be 
demonstrated by the calculation of the radiological consequences of different 
representative accident sequences which have to be precisely defined, 
depending on the design of the plant”. 
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Regarding the subject of radiological consequences for DBAs, which is 
complementary to the ones covered in the key issue of reduced environmental 
source term and emergency plan, the "1995 Consensus Document" of the 
RSWG [19] concludes as follows:
There is currently a lack of consensus on both the methodology and data that 
are used for licensing calculations for both the faults considered (large LOCA 
and steam generator tube rupture (SGTR)) and the sequences considered for 
SGTR faults. It is therefore recommended that there is an endeavour to 
increase the level of harmonisation in the licensing process. It is also 
recommended that future harmonisation on calculations of radioactive 
releases and environmental consequences be based on realistic assumptions. 
As mentioned in [2], the European TSOs agreed that this trend should be 
encouraged.
Regarding severe accidents and future plants, it is recognised that "further
reduction of environmental impact and simplification of emergency planning 
are sought as important targets in some countries". The TSOs pointed out that 
the possible simplification of emergency planning should remain a matter of 
national concern.
As stated in the European TSO study [2], an ideal framework for new NPPs in 
Europe would be a harmonised set of European safety objectives and related 
calculation methodologies, so that the different results obtained in different 
countries for similar plants and scenarios could be explained mainly in terms 
of plant-specific features and site conditions rather than in terms of different 
(often arbitrary) assumptions or calculation tools.
Based on the previous considerations, at least two objectives for further work 
can be formulated: 
x Harmonisation of requirements concerning the radiological 
consequences of any postulated event (within or beyond DBAs):
The internationally accepted common approach is that the recommendations 
given in ICRP Publication 63 "Principles for Intervention for Protection of the 
Public in a Radiological Emergency" [20] and the IAEA Safety Series No. 109 
"Intervention Criteria in a Nuclear or Radiation Emergency" [21] can be 
regarded as widely agreed references concerning the initiation of protective 
actions. The ICRP recommendations provide relatively high intervention levels 
for the "nearly always justified” protective actions (e.g. 500 mSv for 
evacuation), while it provides a rather wide range of values for the so-called 
"optimised values" (50-500 mSv for evacuation). The above cited IAEA 
document [21] provides relatively low "generic intervention levels" (for 
example  50 mSv for evacuation), which may be lowered or increased based 
on local conditions as, for example, population density, adequate 
transportation, weather conditions, etc. These levels were formally approved 
by the IAEA International Basis Safety Standards for Protection Against 
Ionising Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety series 115 
[22]. It seems to be consensus that new NPPs should be designed in a way 
taking into account ICRP document [20] as well as other relevant documents, 
28
such as the two above-mentioned IAEA documents [21, 22] and of course the 
ALARA approach. In this way it would be possible to claim minimal protective 
actions, as suggested by the GPR/RSK recommendations, and provide the 
technical bases for a simplification of the emergency planning for those 
countries where this is sought as an important safety objective.
x Harmonisation of the assumptions and methodologies for the 
quantification of the radiological consequences of representative 
postulated accident sequences (within or beyond DBA conditions) at a 
NPP in Europe:
It is necessary to mention that fairly large and noticeable differences currently 
exist in different countries regarding the radiological consequences of DBAs. 
These differences are mainly due to the use of deterministic rather than risk-
informed assumptions. Development and use of harmonised assumptions and 
methodologies, at least in Europe, is also recommended in the European TSO 
study [2], so that different results in different countries could clearly be justified 
mainly due to different plant features and/or specific site conditions.
5.3   Emergency Response within Emergency Management 
The overall objective of emergency response is to reduce radioactive release 
for a spectrum of accidents that could produce excessive off-site doses. In the 
event of an accident, the plant is required to classify the initiating conditions. 
Example is provided from [23], describing the US approaches. The four 
emergency action levels are defined as follows: unusual event, alert, site area 
emergency, and general emergency (see Fig. 6.2). 
Fig. 5.2 Emergency action levels to classify accidents and recommend 
actions
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Radiation exposure from a nuclear accident can produce two different types of 
health consequences, each of which has very different implications for 
emergency planning. First, severe radiation exposures (greater than 0.5 - 1.0 
Sv), within a short period of time such as a day, can lead to destruction of 
cells in the body and produce a variety of injuries and sicknesses. For more 
extreme exposures greater than 2.0 - 3.0 Sv, such injuries can be fatal and, 
for exposures greater than 5.0 Sv, death is the most likely outcome [23]. 
Second, radiation exposures of any severity may damage generic material in 
cells. Thus, one objective of emergency response is to keep everyone, or as 
many people as possible, well below exposures great enough to produce 
early injuries or death.
5.4   Exposure Protective Options 
The exposure protective options represent the consequence mitigation part. 
The main options for preventing and limiting exposures are:
Evacuation. The best strategy for preventing serious exposures, if feasible, is 
to evacuate people from the area before the radioactive materials arrive.
Sheltering. Placing barriers between the radioactive materials and people is 
effective for some releases. The most commonly available and suitable barrier 
is a building, the walls and roof of which attenuate to some extent the gamma 
radiation. The heavier the construction, the more effective the shielding; 
basements are particularly advantageous locations.
Respiratory protection. Breathing through any of a variety of materials – 
facemasks, tissues, towels, or other cloth – offers significant protection 
against the inhalation of particles.
Relocation. If large amounts of radioactivity persist in the area, sheltering is 
not a sufficient protective measure, and people must be moved from the area 
until it is decontaminated.
Potassium iodide (KI) prophylaxis. Iodine uptake by the body can be 
blocked by the ingestion of stable iodine prior to, or immediately after, 
exposure. If taken properly, potassium iodide will help reduce the dose of 
radiation to the thyroid gland from radioactive iodine, and reduce the risk of 
thyroid cancer.
Decontamination of people. Apart from removing people from the vicinity of 
radioactivity or using barriers, it is, in some situations, desirable to remove 
radioactive materials from the immediate vicinity of people. Decontamination 
includes removing contaminated clothing and washing off external 
contamination.
Decontamination of land and buildings. This is not generally considered an 
emergency response; however, it is important to remember that the significant 
off-site economic costs of a major accident will be for attempted 
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decontamination and for property that is unusable because it cannot be 
sufficiently decontaminated.
Protection of the food chain. Ingestion of contaminated food and water can 
account for nearly half of the aggregate population’s exposure to radioactivity. 
Food-chain interventions are thus crucial to emergency response efforts 
directed toward delayed health effects.
Medical treatment. Finally, there is a need for medical efforts to alleviate 
consequences. Medical care entails screening and follow-up capabilities and 
the possibility of deploying a significant medical infrastructure.
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6. CURRENT APPROACHES TO EMERGENCY PLANNING IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES
One of the first steps of this project consisted in the collection of relevant 
information about current practices in different countries on defining the 
emergency plans and the associated emergency planning zones and on 
implementation of Level 2 and Level 3 PSA results into emergency planning. 
This chapter presents the collected information.
Besides some relevant general information, information from the following 
areas has been collected: 
x Basis for the emergency planning; 
x Definition of emergency planning zones (EPZ); 
x Status of the Level 2 PSA for the NPPs; 
x Requirement to provide information for the public living in the EPZ in 
the event of radiological emergency; 
x Future activities for implementation of Level 2 PSA results into 
emergency planning. 
The following EU countries were involved in this information collection 
exercise: Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, The Netherlands, 
Slovak Republic, Spain and the United Kingdom. In addition, some 
information was obtained from Japan and the USA.
The obtained information is presented in detail in Appendix A. In the next part 
of this chapter the information is evaluated.
6.1   Information Sources 
The main sources of information were: 
x National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety [24-28], 
prepared by the nuclear regulatory authorities (information provided 
from Czech Republic, Hungary, The Netherlands, Slovak Republic and 
UK).
x Personal discussions of the authors of the RELKO report [1] with 
representatives of the nuclear regulatory authorities and relevant 
research institutes of the participating countries (information provided 
from Czech Republic, Hungary, The Netherlands, Slovak Republic and 
UK) [29-33]. 
32
x The first interim report on ”Use of Level 2 PSA information as a basis 
for emergency planning” [34], prepared by Ch. Shepherd, HSE NII, UK, 
within OECD-NEA WGRisk task group (information provided in a form 
of questionnaire from Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Slovak 
Republic, Spain and the United Kingdom).
x Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of 
Nuclear Plants [35, 36], US NRC Radiation Protection and Emergency 
Preparedness home page. Obtained from the USA by e-mail 
communication [37].
6.2   Emergency Preparedness in Selected Countries 
Emergency preparedness means to be ready for emergencies before they 
happen. It is a prudent defence-in-depth measure regardless how small the 
probability of a serious reactor accident is. The objective is to mitigate public 
health consequences in the unlikely case of a reactor accident.
The combined efforts of the nuclear regulatory authorities, the government 
officials and the NPP operators have produced comprehensive emergency 
preparedness programs in each country that assure the adequate protection 
of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The emergency 
preparedness process incorporates the means to rapidly identify, evaluate 
and react to a wide spectrum of emergency conditions. Emergency plans are 
dynamic and are routinely reviewed and updated in order to reflect an ever-
changing environment.
The nuclear regulatory authority issues reactor operating licenses, which 
require an acceptable, integrated emergency plan (i.e., both on-site and off-
site planning) that provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective 
measures will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
The government officials have the overall responsibility of deciding and 
implementing the appropriate protective actions for the public during a NPP 
radiological emergency. They are responsible for notifying the public to take 
protective actions, such as evacuation, sheltering or taking of potassium 
iodide pills. The officials base their decisions on the protective action 
recommendations provided by the NPP and their own radiological or health 
organization. The nuclear regulatory authority provides oversight and 
guidance of the protective action decided by the government officials. 
However, neither the NPP operator nor the regulatory authority can order the 
public to take protective actions.
In each of the countries participating in this project, the appropriate measures 
have been taken to ensure that there are on-site and off-site emergency plans 
that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover the activities to be 
carried out in the event of an emergency.
During the licensing of a NPP not only DBAs but also BDBAs (which are 
normally not covered by the Safety Analysis Report and other licensing 
33
documentation) are taken into consideration in each country. BDBAs are used 
to define the EPZs. The consequences of such events could lead to releases 
into the environment and subsequently to an radiological impact exceeding 
the impact of releases occurring as a result of DBA.
The population within the EPZ closest to the plant is at greatest risk of 
exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. The purpose of radiological 
emergency preparedness is to protect people from the effects of radiation 
exposure after an accident at a NPP. Evacuation is the most effective 
protective measure in the event of a radiological emergency because it 
protects the whole body (including the thyroid gland and other organs) from all 
radionuclides and all exposure pathways. However, in situations when 
evacuation is not feasible, in-place sheltering is substituted as an effective 
protective action. In addition, administering potassium iodide is a reasonable, 
prudent, and inexpensive supplement to both evacuation and sheltering. 
When the population is evacuated out of the area, and potentially 
contaminated foodstuffs are prohibited, the risk from further radioactive iodine 
exposure to the thyroid gland is essentially eliminated.
The above-described principles of emergency planning apply to each country 
participating with information in this project. As described in the next 
subchapter, differences are in the definitions of EPZs.
6.3   Basis for Emergency Preparedness 
Generally, accidents are categorized as DBA (i.e., the plant is designed 
specifically to accommodate them) or BDBAs. The likelihood of a BDBA is 
generally lower than a DBA but the consequences may be higher. To 
determine the response to accidents, both deterministic design basis and 
probabilistic beyond design basis accident analyses are performed.
There are two basic approaches to emergency planning: a deterministic 
approach based on DBAs and a probabilistic approach based on the 
probabilistic assessment of BDBAs.
6.3.1   Deterministic Emergency Planning 
As already mentioned, the approach to emergency planning in EU Member 
States is strongly deterministic. The usual approach is that a reference 
accident has been defined (usually the DBA) which is then used as the basis 
for developing and setting up the emergency plans. From the EU Member 
States, only the Czech Republic and the UK informed about using Level 2 
PSA results in a formal way as input into their emergency arrangements (see 
Appendix A).
The main disadvantage of the deterministic approach is that it analyzes only 
the DBA, e.g. the worst credible accident. However, evaluation of hazards 
should never be limited to the selected reference accident but should always 
34
include the complete spectrum of potential occurrences. Each accident occurs 
differently and produces different consequences.
6.3.2   Risk-informed Emergency Planning 
The proper response to an emergency requires understanding of the 
underlying hazards. Understanding of degraded core behaviour, containment 
phenomena and fission product behaviour is extremely important in 
emergency plans used to manage BDBAs. Such knowledge can be distilled 
from plant-specific Level 2 and 3 PSA studies.
PSA addresses a broad spectrum of initiating events by assessing the event 
frequency and consequences. Mitigating systems reliabilities are assessed, 
including the potential for multiple and common cause failures. The treatment 
therefore goes beyond the single failure requirements of the deterministic 
approach. As already concluded in WASH-1400 [42], PSA studies so far have 
shown that the CDFs are greater than what the industry had generally 
believed possible before the development of PSA methodology. This was 
attributed mainly to two safety-related principles that had governed early 
reactor design: 
x The reactor was considered safe if it was designed for the DBA; 
x Chances of accidents would be reduced tremendously if redundancy in 
safety-related components was employed.
The large LOCA is defined as the DBA against which the emergency core 
coolant system is designed. Similarly, the single failure criteria were applied to 
incorporate redundancy and diversity into the safety systems. The design 
criteria based on these concepts have traditionally been called deterministic 
design criteria. What these criteria had failed to demonstrate in the past and 
what PSAs successfully showed were accident scenarios involving multiple 
failures with significantly higher core damage frequency than expected.
The results of Level 2 and Level 3 PSAs also pointed to certain rare 
accidents, beyond the traditional design basis accidents that could dominate a 
plant's risk spectrum (for example steam generator tube ruptures bypassing 
the containment). Furthermore, the common cause failure issues raised in the 
PSA community have pointed out that redundancy does not improve the 
system reliability to the degree that reactor designers thought it did [38].
As can be seen from Appendix A, Level 2 PSAs are currently being carried 
out or are already available for the NPPs in all of the EU Member States 
analysed in this report. These PSAs give the radiological source terms and 
frequencies for the range of accident sequences that could occur. This 
information could be used in future as basis for preparing emergency plans.
The UK is the only Member State which has been carrying out research to 
consider how the Level 2 PSA information could be used in a systematic way 
for emergency planning purposes.
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Based on the Level 2 PSA results for the Temelín NPP in the Czech Republic, 
it was found that no sequences identified in the PSA have more serious 
consequences than those sequences used as a basis for the (deterministic) 
determination of the EPZ size. This confirms that these accident sequences 
have been selected correctly [39].
Use of PSA results for this purpose in Japan is also limited [11, 34].
The practical application of the Level 2 PSA results for accident management 
is very limited. Furthermore, there is no Level 2 application for emergency 
management. Many NPPs do not have access to the technologies, which 
facilitate full-scope Level 2 or 3 PSAs that treat power operations, low power 
and shutdown operating modes, as well as accidents initiated by external 
events. Common internationally accepted standards for such extensive, in-
depth analyses do not exist.
In summary, it would certainly be desirable that the overall emergency 
management was supported by Level 2 and Level 3 PSA results. The 
following two options could be offered: 
x In the short term, a full-scope plant-specific Level 2 PSA with fission 
product transport capability would be needed for each NPP in the EU. 
Their results coupled with engineering and medical judgements would 
provide an acceptable basis for risk-informed emergency planning. 
x In the longer term, it would be desirable that full-scope Level 3 PSAs 
for all NPPs should be available.
The USA is the only country, which has very extensive application of the Level 
3 PSA methodology to emergency planning. The USA approach to the 
application of Level 3 PSA methodology is described in Appendix B, where 
the main results are presented for all US NPP sites. 
6.4   Emergency Planning Zones 
The following definitions of the emergency planning zones are given in the 
different countries [24-28, 34]:
Belgium: The general EPZs are associated with the following protective 
actions: evacuation (10 km), sheltering (10 km), stable iodine intake (20 km) 
and food chain (whole country). The size of these zones has been defined 
taking into account a rough (presumably largely deterministic) estimation of 
the associated risks.
Czech Republic: The predetermined evacuation of people is performed 
within 5 km internal zone around Temelín NPP and within 10 km internal zone 
around Dukovany NPP. The emergency planning zone is a territory of 20 km 
around Dukovany NPP and 13 km around Temelín NPP. The predetermined 
actions are sheltering and taking iodine tablets. The difference between the 
EPZ for Temelín NPP and for Dukovany NPP is due to different population 
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densities, meteorological and evacuation conditions.
Finland: Rescue service plan (by rescue service authorities) for emergency 
preparedness zone (20+ km); advance iodine pellets and quick actions for 5 
km zone.
Hungary: There are three planning zones: the smallest in radius of 3 km is 
the “precautionary protective action-planning zone” in which the measures are 
introduced without delay. This zone is surrounded by the next 30 km circle 
within which the “urgent protective action planning zone” can be found; and 
then the largest zone of 80 km is located. That is the “long term protective 
action planning zone”. Concerning the latter two zones, special laws 
determine the intervention levels.
Japan: The EPZ is about 8 to 10 km for the facilities of commercial plants and 
research reactors with power levels greater than 50 MWt. The standard of 
EPZ is the zone which boundary (distance from the nuclear facilities) is 
defined so as to keep less than the lower limit of radiation exposure at the 
boundary, 10 mSv to whole body dose and 100 mSv to thyroid with sufficient 
margins supposing hypothetical accidents that cannot happen technically. 
Outside this range, there is no necessity of emergency actions such as 
sheltering and evacuation.
The Netherlands: The various zones for direct measures are defined 
geographically as follows: 1) Evacuation zone circle with a radius of 5 km, 2) 
Iodine prophylaxis circle with a radius of 10 km, 3) Sheltering zone: circle with 
a radius of 20 km. The measures in cases of nuclear emergencies are 
coordinated at the national level.
Slovak Republic: The EPZ is defined in relation to the maximum size of any 
radiation emergency that can be reasonably foreseen. The hazard area 
represents a circle with centre in the nuclear facility and radius 30 km for 
Bohunice site, and 20 km for Mochovce site. In case that the boundary 
demarcating the hazard area interferes with an inhabited area, then the whole 
inhabited area is considered as a hazard area. The difference in the EPZ for 
Bohunice NPP and Mochovce NPP is due to different population density, 
meteorology and evacuation conditions.
Spain: The definition is included in the Basic Nuclear Emergency Plan and it 
is common to all NPPs. These zones are predefined in function of the 
distance at the nuclear site (concentric zones) and of the wind direction 
(sector zones). The required different actions depend on each zone and the 
emergency situation. This is related to the emergency category, established in 
the Internal Emergency Plan and according to the Final Safety Assessment 
Report.
UK: For each nuclear licensed site in the UK there is a defined zone round the 
site – the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) within which the 
arrangements to protect the public are planned in detail. The boundary of this 
zone is defined in relation to the maximum size of any radiation emergency 
that can be reasonably foreseen and ranges from 1 to 5 km. It is also 
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recognised that radiation emergencies could occur that would have 
consequences beyond the DEPZ. The nature of the response required is 
more difficult to predict and will depend on a number of factors such as the 
characteristics of the release that has occurred and the prevailing weather 
conditions. To deal with this, there is a requirement that the emergency plans 
incorporate arrangements for “extendibility” beyond the DEPZ.
USA: To facilitate a preplanned strategy for protective actions during an 
emergency, there are two emergency planning zones (EPZs) around each 
NPP: 1) The plume exposure pathway EPZ has a radius of about 10 miles (16 
km) from the reactor. Predetermined protection actions include sheltering, 
evacuation, and the use of potassium iodide where appropriate. 2) Ingestion 
Exposure Pathway EPZ. It has a radius of about 50 miles (80 km) from the 
reactor. Predetermined protection actions include a ban of contaminated food 
and water.
6.5   Information to the Public 
The approach regarding the requirement to provide information for the public 
living in the EPZ in the event of radiological emergency is the same or similar 
in all countries evaluated in this project.
Immediately after becoming aware that an incident has occurred that may 
result in a radiation dose that exceeds the government protective action limits, 
responsible NPP personnel evaluate plant conditions and then make 
protective action recommendations to the government offices on how to 
protect the population. Neither the NPP operator nor the nuclear regulatory 
authority can order the public to take protective actions. The plant operator 
recommends to the appropriate government offices which protective actions 
(such as evacuation, sheltering, or taking potassium iodide pills) to take while 
the regulatory body provides oversight and guidance from its incident 
response centers.
The government response organizations are responsible for deciding which of 
the recommended actions are necessary to protect the public and for 
communicating these decisions to the public within a short time. Once the 
local emergency response organization has been activated, it will establish a 
local emergency operations centre to coordinate decisions and 
implementation of protective actions with other government organizations.
A prompt alert and notification system is in place to notify the public within the 
EPZ of a NPP. This system will be activated within a short time after the 
decision by government agencies of a need to take protective actions. This 
system typically uses sirens, tone-alert radios or a combination of these 
methods. After receiving the alert the radio or television stations identified in 
emergency information materials will provide information and emergency 
instructions to follow. Citizens living near a NPP receive emergency 
information annually on how they will be notified given a problem at a facility 
and what actions to take.
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More detailed information for individual countries is provided in Appendix A.
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7. INFORMATION TEMPLATE FOR EUROPEAN NPP RISK
MAPPING
In recent years, particular attention has focused on Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) which allow the merging of geographical, spatial or location 
data at the scale and extent of an accident with information on settlement 
patterns, infrastructure and characteristics of the affected population. 
Therefore, GIS can be used not only for pre-event vulnerability assessment 
but also for improving preparedness, mitigation and response plan activities.
Within this project, it is intended to ultimately arrive at a consensus on an 
information template for European NPP risk mapping, which could be 
integrated in a GIS for public information purposes. A proposal for such a 
template as well as for possible future activities in this area are given in this 
chapter.
7.1   The Required Parameters 
Collection and access to information and data, as well as their most accurate 
evaluation are of paramount importance in the identification, assessment and 
prevention of risk. However, they are equally important to deal with 
emergencies before accident occurs, i.e. for identification of potential sources 
of accident, accurate appraisal of scale and impacts and knowledge of the 
human, technical and economic environment in which they occur. Quality 
information of this kind, especially when it embodies lessons learned from 
similar accidents serves various purposes: it helps to speed up the emergency 
response, it reduces the likelihood of unpleasant surprises and it contributes 
to ensuring the adequacy of the emergency response measures taken.
Nevertheless, the problem becomes much more complex when an accident 
affects more than one country, necessitating co-ordination of information and 
data to ensure that the emergency response can proceed effectively. For the 
purpose of the European NPP risk mapping it is necessary to map out 
possible parameters for describing the effects of nuclear accident on the 
community and for highlighting its vulnerabilities. Such parameters comprise 
health effects, damage to private property and environmental damage. The 
Level 3 PSA provides the required parameters for the NPPs.
However, the risk can be changed. Many factors could potentially increase the 
consequences to the general public resulting from a severe-accident release. 
A comprehensive listing and description of factors that influence 
consequences are provided for example in the NUREG/CR-2300 PRA 
Procedures Guide [40]. The primary assumption is that regulatory controls will 
ensure that the physical plant condition (i.e., the predicted probability of 
radioactive releases from an accident) will be maintained at a constant level 
during the plant lifetime. Therefore, the frequency and magnitude of a release 
will remain relatively constant. In other words, significant changes in 
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consequences will result only from changes in the NPP external environment. 
Such factors include e.g. population density, meteorology, and evacuation. 
Studies have shown that some factors have a greater degree of influence than 
others; for example, population has a very strong influence over risk, e.g. 
NUREG-1150 [41]). Evacuation can have a significant influence on early 
fatality risk but a much more limited impact on latent fatality risk. Interdiction 
primarily reduces latent fatality risk. While particular aspects of meteorology, 
such as rainfall, can have a significant impact on peak risk values, mean 
health effect values are relatively insensitive to meteorology.
To illustrate these considerations, data for the Millstone NPP provide a good 
example of the process by which the risk can be influenced by external 
impact. The early fatality of 0.025 fatalities/y is predicted for 2050. This value 
is higher than that reported in the Millstone for the year 2010 (0.0008 
fatalities/y) and represents the increase in early fatalities that could occur as a 
result of increased population around the Millstone site [35].
When the basic reasons for the risk influence of each factor are examined, 
these factors can generally be reduced to the following three issues:
x The number of people exposed to the severe accident release;
x The likelihood that any given individual receives an exposure; 
x The amount of radiation the individual receives.
Consequently, site population (which reflects the number of people potentially 
at risk to severe accident exposure) and wind direction frequency (which 
reflects the likelihood of exposure) have been chosen as the primary factors 
affecting risks.
Two types of information sets are recommended to be involved in the 
information template for European NPP risk mapping for each NPP:
1) Generic information about the risk: 
x Total expected early fatalities; 
x Total expected late fatalities; 
x Expected economic impacts; 
x Expected amount of radiation the individuals receive depending on the 
distance from the plant.
2) Information about changes in the plant external environment (factors, which 
change the risk):
x Site population; 
x Wind direction frequency.
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If there are changes in the plant external environment, the risk would have to 
be recalculated.
7.2  Recommendations for the Future Activities 
Before starting development of this project, JRC-IE conducted a basic 
preliminary search. Based on OECD NEA report entitled “The Use and 
Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in NEA Member States”, 
published in July 2002 [11] and the Working material of IAEA/US NRC 
Technical Committee Meeting on  “Risk-informed Decision Making”, which 
was held in Washington DC, USA, in November 2001 [45], the following 
essential information and conclusions on relevant using PSA was found:
1. The proposed project Benchmarking and Harmonising Strategic 
Planning Practices for Emergency Zoning and Information to the Public 
sounded feasible and realistic. It might be useful to make a rather 
detailed search, including possibly interviews with some well-known 
PSA and emergency planning experts. 
2. The most relevant experience/know-how might be found in Japan, The 
Netherlands, South Africa, UK and USA.
Further development of the project continued in close technical co-operation 
with RELKO Ltd, Engineering and Consulting Services, Bratislava, Slovak 
Republic. The present report is largely based on the report RELKO/1R1204 
Benchmarking and Harmonising Strategic Planning Practices for Emergency 
Zoning and Information to the Public (Report prepared for JRC), December 
2004, Bratislava [1].
Based on the state-of-the-art of developments and achievements in 
application of PSA technology, the original hypothesis to this project consisted 
in the view that it is currently already mature enough to be used also for NPP 
emergency risk zoning. However, at present it can be stated that there is still a 
need to build significant momentum towards the application of Level 3 PSA 
results for emergency planning in EU Member States. Therefore, a decision 
was made to approach some PSA experts on one side and emergency 
planning/radiation protection experts on the other, with the question: Is
incorporation of risk-informed support into NPP emergency planning currently 
a relevant enough topic to be treated by a technical seminar with a view to 
international harmonisation, or is the topic somewhat premature at the present 
stage.
JRC-IE received a great many positive and even very positive responses with 
only very few rather reserved ones. That is why the organising of this seminar 
is one of the outcomes of the project as well (see Appendix C). After 
discussing the topical issues within the seminar, a follow-up decision should 
be made to effectively continue in relevant research and development (R&D) 
activities.
Regarding recommendations for future activities, from the review performed, it 
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could be proposed to carry out a series of reviews of the NPP safety 
management in several countries, which could involve accident, emergency 
and risk management. The reviews would focus on the consistency of the 
related policies, on their ability to deal with the new challenges and on 
identifying opportunities for improvement and best practices. Such a project 
would have to show the applicability of the results for emergency 
managements and their limitations.
Preparation of full-scope Level 2 PSAs with fission product transport capability 
as well as of full-scope Level 3 PSA studies for each NPP in EU Member 
States should be encouraged.
To fulfill these objectives, the following steps could be considered:
x Identify sources of hazard and develop accident scenarios;
x Quantify the uncertainty of factors and parameters and evaluate the 
probability of scenarios;
x Evaluate consequences by determining the pathway to exposure 
(exposure assessment) and the response to exposure (dose-response 
assessment);
x Combine evaluated consequences and probabilities and compare them 
with risk limits;
x Evaluate sensitivity of results to changes in parameters;
x Summarize various elements of risk assessment to facilitate 
communication with relevant stakeholders, incl. general public;
x Perform risk reduction analysis, where the needs, options and their 
costs are compared;
x Make safety management decisions based on risk assessment results.
Finally, the development of a European NPP risk map based on plant-specific 
PSA results is considered an important task to present the risk from the use of 
nuclear power in a consistent and objective way to relevant stakeholders. The 
basis of such a mapping would have to be a harmonised "risk information 
template" at European level, based on the consensus of the developers and 
owners of this information.
Where consensus on publication of information at a European level cannot be 
achieved, it would be essential to clearly document the “sensitivities” of 
individual countries / stakeholders in terms of data confidentiality etc. Criteria 
to come to a corresponding European consensus are the relevance of 
information (sufficient level of detail), its easily understandable character and 
the acceptability for publication by national authorities in terms of different 
national legislation, values and habits. The mechanism to reach this 
consensus is consultation of experts from designated contact points in the 
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participating countries and analysis of related legislation, as well as of plant-
specific PSAs and other information resources used.
As a long term perspective, the development of a European risk map for all 
major hazardous industries (energy sector, process industries, transport etc.) 
could be put in place for discussion.
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The evaluation of a first set of information collected from different countries in 
the course of this project leads to the following conclusions:
1. There are significant differences in the way Member States have drawn 
up the emergency plans and have defined emergency planning zones.
2. The approach to emergency planning is strongly deterministic and 
almost no risk-based information is used.
3. The proper response to an emergency requires an understanding of 
the underlying hazards. The results of Level 2 and 3 PSAs provide 
important information in this area.
4. Level 2 PSAs are currently available for many NPPs in the EU. 
However, the results are practically not used in emergency planning.
5. Full scope Level 3 PSA is available only for very few NPPs in the EU. 
6. There is a way of improving the existing approach to emergency 
planning in EU Member States: In addition to the deterministic 
approach, risk-based aspects to emergency preparedness should be 
implemented. Such an approach would also facilitate the development 
of a European NPP risk map in the future.
Recommendations for future activities are: 
1. To enhance current NPP emergency planning practices by risk-
informed aspects, Level 2 and 3 PSA results should be considered.
2. Full-scope Level 2 PSA covering fission product transport capability 
should be prepared for each NPP.
3. Full-scope Level 3 PSA should be developed in the longer term.  
4. Regarding possible future activities of JRC, it could be proposed to 
prepare a Level 2 – 3 Pilot Project Study with the aim to show the 
applicability of the generic results for emergency management and risk 
zoning purposes. 
5. Development of the European NPP risk map based on PSA results. As 
a first step, international consensus should be achieved together with 
the developers and owners of the "risk information" on a harmonised 
information template to publish corresponding results to different 
stakeholders, including the public, at a European level.
6. Long-term development of a European risk map for all potentially major 
hazardous industries.
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7. For all these purposes, the creation of an international topical Working 
Group would be necessary.
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APPENDIX  A 
______________________________________________________________
Essential Information on Emergency Planning in Selected 
Countries
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ra
d
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c
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 f
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m
e
n
ta
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L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
Be
lg
iu
m
Th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
 z
on
es
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
fo
llo
wi
ng
 p
ro
te
ct
ive
 
a
ct
io
ns
: e
va
cu
at
io
n 
(10
 km
), 
sh
el
te
rin
g 
(10
 km
), s
tab
le 
io
di
ne
 in
ta
ke
 (2
0 k
m)
 an
d 
fo
od
 c
ha
in
 (w
ho
le 
co
un
try
). 
Th
e 
si
ze
 o
f t
he
se
 z
on
es
 h
as
 
be
en
 d
ef
in
ed
 ta
kin
g 
in
to
 
a
cc
o
u
n
t a
 ro
ug
h 
es
tim
at
io
n 
o
f t
he
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
ris
ks
.  
Th
is
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
s 
al
so
 
e
xp
lic
itly
 in
clu
de
d 
in
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l n
uc
le
ar
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
 a
nd
 is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 D
ire
ct
ive
 
89
/6
18
/E
ur
at
om
. T
hi
s 
in
cl
ud
es
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
: 
-
Ba
si
c 
co
nc
ep
ts
 o
f 
ra
di
at
io
n 
an
d 
he
al
th
 
e
ffe
ct
s 
-
Ty
pe
s 
of
 
e
m
e
rg
en
cie
s 
an
d 
a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
co
n
se
qu
en
ce
s
-
Em
er
ge
nc
y
a
rr
a
n
ge
m
en
ts
 to
 
a
le
rt,
 p
ro
te
ct
 a
nd
 
a
ss
is
t t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
du
rin
g 
em
er
ge
nc
ie
s 
-
Ad
eq
ua
te
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
re
sp
on
se
 a
ct
io
ns
 in
 
ca
se
 o
f a
n 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
.
Th
e 
ba
sis
 o
f t
he
 e
xis
tin
g 
o
n
-s
ite
 N
PP
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
s 
is 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
n
u
cl
ea
r e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
 
gi
vin
g 
a 
ge
ne
ra
l s
tru
ct
ur
e 
o
f s
uc
h 
pl
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
po
st
-
TM
I a
ct
io
ns
.  
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
s 
ha
ve
 
be
en
 m
ad
e 
fo
r D
oe
l 1
 
a
n
d 
2 
an
d 
Ti
ha
ng
e 
1.
 
Th
es
e 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
s 
a
re
 li
m
ite
d 
to
 a
 
pr
ob
ab
ilis
tic
 a
na
lys
is 
o
f c
on
ta
in
m
en
t f
ai
lu
re
 
m
o
de
s,
 d
o 
no
t c
ov
er
 
sh
ut
do
wn
 s
ta
te
s 
an
d 
do
 n
ot
 in
clu
de
 s
ou
rc
e 
te
rm
 a
na
lys
is.
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 p
la
ns
 in
 
th
is
 a
re
a 
fo
r t
he
 fu
tu
re
.  
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p
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 p
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ra
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c
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 f
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p
la
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in
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ec
h
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ep
ub
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Th
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pr
ed
et
er
m
in
ed
 
e
va
cu
a
tio
n 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
is 
pe
rfo
rm
ed
 w
ith
in
 5
 k
m
 
in
te
rn
al
 z
on
e 
ar
ou
nd
 T
em
el
ín
 
N
PP
 a
nd
 w
ith
in
 1
0 
km
 
in
te
rn
al
 z
on
e 
ar
ou
nd
 
D
uk
ov
an
y 
NP
P.
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
 z
on
e 
is 
fo
rm
ed
 b
y 
a 
te
rri
to
ry
 o
f 2
0 
km
 
a
ro
u
n
d 
th
e 
Du
ko
va
ny
 N
PP
 
a
n
d 
13
 k
m
 a
ro
un
d 
th
e 
Te
m
el
ín
 N
PP
. T
he
 
pr
ed
et
er
m
in
ed
 a
ct
io
ns
 a
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sh
el
te
rin
g 
an
d 
ta
kin
g 
KI
 
ta
bl
et
s.
Th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
EP
Z 
fo
r 
D
uk
ov
an
y 
NP
P 
an
d 
Te
m
el
ín
 
N
PP
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 d
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 d
iff
er
en
t 
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tio
n 
de
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m
e
te
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ol
og
y 
an
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ua
tio
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n
di
tio
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.
Th
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of
f-s
ite
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
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an
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se
t d
ow
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rg
et
s 
an
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m
e
th
od
s 
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ur
in
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th
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l t
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f p
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u
n
te
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at
io
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f p
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rin
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le
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ua
tio
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 p
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pl
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ud
in
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do
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et
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ec
ks
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de
co
nt
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in
at
io
n 
at
 th
e 
e
xi
ts
 fr
om
 th
e 
en
da
ng
er
ed
 
te
rri
to
ry
,
x
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
of
 p
er
so
ns
 
m
o
ve
m
e
n
ts
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
e
n
da
ng
er
ed
 te
rri
to
ry
, 
x
H
ea
lth
 c
ar
e.
  
Pu
bl
ic 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
m
an
ua
l f
or
 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f a
 ra
di
at
io
n 
a
cc
id
en
t i
s 
di
st
rib
ut
ed
. T
he
 
m
a
n
u
a
ls
 c
on
ta
in
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
o
n
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
sh
al
l f
ol
lo
w 
af
te
r t
he
 w
ar
ni
ng
 
si
gn
al
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
 z
on
e.
R
ef
er
en
ce
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 h
av
e 
be
en
 d
ef
in
ed
 fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 
th
e 
si
te
s.
 T
hi
s 
is
 
co
n
si
de
re
d 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
bo
un
di
ng
 a
cc
id
en
t f
or
 a
ll 
u
n
its
 o
f n
uc
le
ar
 p
ow
er
 
pl
an
t o
n 
th
e 
sit
e.
Fo
r 
th
e 
Te
m
el
ín
 p
la
nt
 i
t 
w
a
s 
st
at
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 r
es
ul
ts
, t
ha
t 
n
o
 s
e
qu
en
ce
s 
id
en
tif
ie
d 
in
 
Le
ve
l 
2 
PS
A 
ha
ve
 m
o
re
 
se
rio
us
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 
th
an
 
th
os
e 
se
qu
en
ce
s 
u
se
d 
as
 
a 
ba
sis
 
fo
r 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 E
PZ
 
si
ze
. I
t c
on
fir
m
s 
th
at
 th
es
e 
ba
se
 a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
es
 
ha
ve
 
be
en
 
se
le
ct
ed
 
co
rr
e
ct
ly.
  
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 s
tu
dy
 is
 
pr
ep
ar
ed
 fo
r b
ot
h 
D
uk
ov
an
y 
an
d 
Te
m
el
ín
 N
PP
 fo
r f
ul
l 
po
we
r a
nd
 s
hu
td
ow
n 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
m
od
es
.
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 p
la
ns
 in
 
th
is
 a
re
a 
fo
r t
he
 fu
tu
re
.  
5
3
C
o
u
n
tr
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D
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io
n
 o
f 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
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p
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n
n
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g
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o
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P
Z
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R
e
q
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to
 p
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 p
u
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n
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h
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P
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h
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v
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ra
d
io
lo
g
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a
l 
e
m
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n
c
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B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 f
o
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 i
n
to
 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 
Fi
nl
an
d
R
es
cu
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
pl
an
 (b
y 
re
sc
u
e
 s
e
rv
ic
e 
au
th
or
iti
es
) 
fo
r e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 z
on
e 
(20
+ 
km
); a
dv
an
ce
 io
din
e p
ell
ets
 
a
n
d 
fa
st
 a
ct
io
ns
 fo
r 5
 k
m
 
zo
n
e
); n
o p
op
ula
tio
n 
ce
n
tre
s 
or
 o
th
er
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 
th
at
 a
re
 d
iff
icu
lt 
to
 
e
va
cu
a
te
.
By
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
is 
no
tif
ie
d 
to
 ta
ke
 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ac
tio
ns
 in
 c
as
e 
of
 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
.
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
m
an
ua
ls 
on
 
ra
di
at
io
n 
ac
cid
en
ts
 a
re
 
di
st
rib
ut
ed
 e
ve
ry
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
to
 
e
ve
ry
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 in
 E
PZ
.
Th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is 
to
 
ha
ve
 a
 re
sc
ue
 
se
rv
ic
e 
pl
an
 fo
r 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
nn
in
g 
zo
n
e
. 
N
o 
sp
ec
ia
l 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
e 
ha
s 
be
en
 u
se
d 
as
 
de
sig
n 
ba
sis
.
A 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 fo
r L
ov
iis
a 
po
we
r p
la
nt
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
m
ad
e 
fo
r f
ul
l p
ow
er
, i
nt
er
na
l 
in
iti
at
in
g 
ev
en
ts
. 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
 is
 n
ot
 
ba
se
d 
on
 p
ro
ba
bi
liti
es
 o
r 
im
pr
ob
ab
ilit
ie
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
, 
PS
A 
ha
s 
pr
od
uc
ed
 
e
xt
en
si
ve
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
es
 a
nd
 
re
le
as
es
 to
 th
e 
e
n
vi
ro
nm
en
t; 
“ty
pi
ca
l” 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
es
 w
ith
 
la
rg
e 
re
le
as
es
, t
he
 re
le
as
e 
tim
in
g,
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 a
nd
 
co
n
te
nt
, a
re
 li
st
ed
 in
 th
e 
pl
an
t e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
.
Th
e 
ac
ci
de
nt
 s
eq
ue
nc
es
 in
 
PS
A 
ar
e 
go
in
g 
to
 b
e 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 fo
r e
xt
er
na
l a
nd
 
a
re
a
 e
ve
n
ts
, a
ls
o 
fo
r 
sh
ut
do
wn
 s
ta
te
s.
 A
lso
 it
 is
 
pl
an
ne
d,
 b
ut
 n
ot
 y
et
 
de
cid
ed
 –
 to
 m
ak
e 
in
 
a
dv
an
ce
 s
om
e 
ro
ug
h 
sc
e
n
a
rio
s 
w
ith
 a
cc
id
en
t 
se
qu
en
ce
s,
 s
ou
rc
e 
te
rm
s 
a
n
d 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
co
n
ce
rn
in
g 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
a
ct
io
ns
. N
ev
er
th
el
es
s,
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fro
m
 P
SA
 
Le
ve
l 2
 is
 u
til
is
ed
 w
he
n 
cr
e
a
tin
g 
se
qu
en
ce
 
de
sc
rip
tio
ns
 fo
r a
cc
id
en
t 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 d
ril
ls.
 T
he
 
ris
k 
im
po
rta
nc
es
 o
f 
di
ffe
re
nt
 a
cc
id
en
t 
se
qu
en
ce
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ch
an
ge
d 
in
 th
e 
pa
st
 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 p
la
nt
 
m
o
di
fic
at
io
ns
 d
on
e 
al
m
os
t 
a
n
n
u
a
lly
. T
hi
s 
wi
ll c
on
tin
ue
 
so
m
e
 ti
m
e,
 a
nd
 h
as
 s
om
e 
e
ffe
ct
 o
n 
ho
w 
sp
ec
ific
al
ly 
PS
A 
re
su
lts
 a
re
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
nn
in
g.
5
4
C
o
u
n
tr
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D
e
fi
n
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io
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e
m
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e
n
c
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p
la
n
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in
g
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o
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E
P
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R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e
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fo
rm
a
ti
o
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o
r 
th
e
 p
u
b
li
c
 
li
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 E
P
Z
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
e
v
e
n
t 
o
f 
ra
d
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 
P
S
A
 f
o
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
H
un
ga
ry
Am
on
g 
th
e 
pl
an
ni
ng
 z
on
es
, 
th
e 
sm
al
le
st
 in
 ra
di
us
 o
f 3
 
km
, i
s 
th
e 
“p
re
ca
ut
io
na
ry
 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ac
tio
n 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
zo
n
e
”,
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 b
e 
in
tro
du
ce
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
wi
th
ou
t u
nd
ue
 
de
la
y 
wi
th
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
pr
el
im
in
ar
y 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
. 
Th
is
 c
irc
le
 is
 s
ur
ro
un
de
d 
by
 
th
e 
ne
xt
, 3
0 
km
, c
irc
le
 w
ith
in
 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
“u
rg
en
t p
ro
te
ct
ive
 
a
ct
io
n-
pl
an
ni
ng
 z
on
e”
 c
an
 b
e 
fo
un
d;
 a
nd
 th
en
 th
e 
la
rg
es
t 
o
n
e
, 
o
f 8
0 
km
, t
he
 “l
on
g-
 
te
rm
 p
ro
te
ct
ive
 a
ct
io
n 
pl
an
ni
ng
 z
on
e”
 is
 lo
ca
te
d.
 
Co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
la
tte
r t
wo
, 
sp
ec
ia
l la
ws
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
le
ve
ls
, t
he
 ta
ki
ng
 
in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f w
hi
ch
 s
ha
ll b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 fo
r d
et
er
m
in
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ac
tio
ns
 to
 b
e 
in
tro
du
ce
d.
In
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
of
 p
re
se
nt
 
H
un
ga
ria
n 
le
gi
sla
tio
n 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
is 
th
e 
ta
sk
 o
f t
he
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
(S
tat
e 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Re
sp
on
se
 
O
rg
an
isa
tio
n),
 bu
t in
 th
e 
e
a
rly
 s
ta
ge
s 
of
 a
n 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 th
e 
op
er
at
or
 o
f 
n
u
cl
ea
r f
ac
ilit
y 
m
us
t s
up
po
rt 
th
e 
w
or
k 
of
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s.
 T
he
 
pu
bl
ic 
is 
wa
rn
ed
 b
y 
in
st
al
le
d 
si
re
ns
 (a
rou
nd
 nu
cle
ar 
po
we
r 
pl
an
t) o
r th
rou
gh
 ra
dio
 an
d 
te
le
vi
si
on
. T
he
 o
pe
ra
to
r o
f 
n
u
cl
ea
r f
ac
ilit
y 
m
ay
 a
lso
 
is
su
e 
pr
es
s 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
nd
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 th
ro
ug
h 
ra
di
o,
 
te
le
vi
si
on
 a
nd
 p
re
ss
 a
fte
r a
 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
wi
th
 P
ub
lic
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
G
ro
up
. T
hi
s 
gr
ou
p 
is 
a 
pa
rt 
of
 S
ta
te
 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Re
sp
on
se
 
O
rg
an
isa
tio
n.
Th
e 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
s 
of
 
Pa
ks
 N
PP
 ta
ke
 in
to
 
a
cc
o
u
n
t e
m
er
ge
nc
ie
s 
wi
th
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 re
le
as
es
 a
nd
 
e
xp
os
ur
e 
pa
th
wa
ys
. A
 
bo
un
di
ng
 a
cc
id
en
t i
s 
no
t 
de
fin
ed
, h
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 
de
ta
ile
d 
an
al
ys
es
 o
f a
 
se
rio
us
 a
cc
id
en
t 
se
qu
en
ce
 w
er
e 
co
n
si
de
re
d 
du
rin
g 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
nn
in
g.
Al
th
ou
gh
 th
e 
cu
rre
nt
 
N
uc
le
ar
 S
af
et
y 
Co
de
s 
a
tta
ch
ed
 to
 th
e 
De
cr
ee
 
o
f G
ov
er
nm
en
t d
o 
no
t 
re
qu
ire
 L
ev
el
 2
 P
SA
 
st
ud
ie
s 
to
 b
e 
pe
rfo
rm
ed
 fo
r N
PP
s 
in
 
H
un
ga
ry
, t
he
 
H
un
ga
ria
n 
At
om
ic 
En
er
gy
 A
ut
ho
rit
y 
ha
s 
re
qu
es
te
d 
th
is 
st
ud
y 
fro
m
 th
e 
NP
P.
 T
he
 
st
ud
y 
de
vo
te
d 
to
 th
e 
po
in
t e
st
im
at
io
n 
of
 
ra
di
oa
ct
ivi
ty
 re
le
as
e 
a
n
d 
its
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 w
as
 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 la
st
 y
ea
r 
a
n
d 
pa
ss
ed
 to
 th
e 
Au
th
or
ity
 fo
r 
e
va
lu
at
io
n.
 C
ur
re
nt
ly 
its
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 
a
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
t i
s 
be
in
g 
pe
rfo
rm
ed
.
Ye
s,
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
of
 s
er
io
us
 
a
cc
id
en
t m
an
ag
em
en
t 
gu
id
es
.
5
5
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 z
o
n
e
s
 (
E
P
Z
) 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e
 p
u
b
li
c
 
li
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 E
P
Z
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
e
v
e
n
t 
o
f 
ra
d
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 
P
S
A
 f
o
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
Ja
pa
n
Th
e 
EP
Z 
is
 a
bo
ut
 8
 to
 1
0 
km
 
fo
r t
he
 fa
cil
itie
s 
of
 
co
m
m
e
rc
ia
l p
la
nt
s 
an
d 
re
se
a
rc
h 
re
ac
to
rs
 w
ith
 p
ow
er
 
le
ve
ls
 g
re
at
er
 th
an
 5
0 
M
W
t.
Th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 o
f E
PZ
 is
 th
e 
zo
n
e
 w
hi
ch
 b
ou
nd
ar
y 
(di
sta
nc
e f
rom
 th
e n
uc
lea
r 
fa
cil
itie
s) 
is 
de
fin
ed
 so
 as
 to
 
ke
ep
 le
ss
 th
an
 th
e 
lo
we
r l
im
it 
o
f r
ad
ia
tio
n 
ex
po
su
re
 a
t t
he
 
bo
un
da
ry
, 1
0 
m
Sv
 to
 w
ho
le
 
bo
dy
 d
os
e 
an
d 
10
0 
m
Sv
 to
 
th
yr
oi
d 
wi
th
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 
m
a
rg
in
s 
su
pp
os
in
g 
hy
po
th
et
ica
l a
cc
id
en
ts
 th
at
 
ca
n
n
o
t h
ap
pe
n 
te
ch
ni
ca
lly
. 
O
ut
sid
e 
th
is 
ra
ng
e,
 th
er
e 
is 
n
o
 n
e
ce
ss
ity
 o
f e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
a
ct
io
ns
 s
uc
h 
as
 s
he
lte
rin
g 
a
n
d 
ev
ac
ua
tio
n.
Up
on
 th
e 
de
cla
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 b
y 
na
tio
na
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t, 
lo
ca
l p
ub
lic
 
bo
dy
 s
ha
ll i
m
m
ed
ia
te
ly 
pr
ov
id
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
m
e
m
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 p
ub
lic
 w
ho
 
liv
e 
in
 th
e 
vi
ci
ni
ty
 o
f t
he
 
n
u
cl
ea
r f
ac
ilit
y.
Th
e 
te
nt
at
iv
e 
di
st
an
ce
 fo
r 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
Zo
ne
 to
 n
uc
le
ar
 p
ow
er
 
pl
an
t i
s 
pr
op
os
ed
 a
t 8
a1
0
km
 in
 J
ap
an
es
e 
G
ui
de
lin
e 
o
f n
uc
le
ar
 ra
di
at
io
n 
ha
za
rd
 p
re
ve
nt
io
n.
 T
hi
s 
va
lu
e 
is
 s
et
 th
at
 n
o 
sh
el
te
rin
g 
wo
ul
d 
be
 
n
e
e
de
d 
fo
r t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
be
in
g 
be
yo
nd
 th
is 
di
st
an
ce
.
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 re
su
lts
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
se
ve
re
 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
es
, 
ra
di
ol
og
ica
l s
ou
rc
e 
te
rm
s,
 a
nd
 fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s 
fo
r t
he
 ra
ng
e 
of
 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
es
 
th
at
 c
ou
ld
 o
cc
ur
 a
re
 
u
se
d 
as
 th
e 
ba
sis
 fo
r 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e 
nu
cle
ar
 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
ns
 a
nd
 
th
e 
se
ve
re
 a
cc
id
en
t 
m
a
n
a
ge
m
en
t o
f L
W
R 
pl
an
ts
. T
he
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 
a
n
a
lyt
ica
l m
od
el
s 
of
 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 c
an
 
co
n
tri
bu
te
 to
 th
e 
a
dv
an
ce
m
en
t o
f t
he
 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
nn
in
g 
a
s 
w
e
ll 
as
 to
 th
e 
pe
rio
di
ca
l P
SA
 a
nd
 th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 g
oa
l s
tu
dy
.
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 p
la
ns
 in
 
th
e 
ne
ar
 fu
tu
re
. F
irs
t 
th
e 
fu
tu
re
 o
f L
ev
el
 2
 
PS
A 
wi
ll h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
di
sc
us
se
d.
  
5
6
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 z
o
n
e
s
 (
E
P
Z
) 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e
 p
u
b
li
c
 
li
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 E
P
Z
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
e
v
e
n
t 
o
f 
ra
d
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 
P
S
A
 f
o
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
Th
e
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Th
e 
va
rio
us
 z
on
es
 fo
r d
ire
ct
 
m
e
a
su
re
s 
a
re
 d
ef
in
ed
 
ge
og
ra
ph
ica
lly
 a
s 
fo
llo
ws
:
x
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
zo
ne
: 
ci
rc
le
 w
ith
 ra
di
us
 o
f 5
 k
m
; 
x
Io
di
ne
 p
ro
ph
yla
xis
: 
ci
rc
le
 w
ith
 ra
di
us
 o
f 1
0 
km
; 
x
Sh
el
te
rin
g 
zo
ne
: 
ci
rc
le
 w
ith
 ra
di
us
 o
f 2
0 
km
. 
It 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
no
te
d,
 h
ow
ev
er
, 
th
at
 m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 c
as
es
 o
f 
n
u
cl
ea
r e
m
er
ge
nc
ie
s 
ar
e 
co
o
rd
in
at
ed
 a
t t
he
 n
at
io
na
l 
le
ve
l.
Th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t i
s 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r i
nf
or
m
in
g 
th
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n.
 It
 d
oe
s 
th
is 
in
 
co
n
jun
cti
on
 w
ith
 th
e l
oc
al 
a
u
th
or
iti
es
 in
 q
ue
st
io
n.
Th
e 
Bo
rs
se
le
 N
PP
 h
as
 
e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
th
e 
le
ve
ls 
fro
m
 th
e 
IA
EA
 s
ys
te
m
 in
 
its
 E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
: 
1) 
Em
erg
en
cy
 
st
an
db
y;
2) 
Pl
an
t e
m
er
ge
nc
y;
  
3) 
Sit
e e
m
e
rg
en
cy
; 
4) 
Of
f-s
ite
 em
e
rg
en
cy
In
 th
e 
ea
rly
 1
99
0s
 th
e 
Le
ve
l 1
+ 
PS
As
 w
er
e 
e
xp
an
de
d 
to
 fu
ll-
sc
op
e 
Le
ve
l 3
 P
SA
s,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 
e
xt
er
na
l e
ve
nt
s,
 p
ow
er
 
a
n
d 
no
n-
po
we
r p
la
nt
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
st
at
es
, 
hu
m
an
 e
rro
rs
 o
f 
o
m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 
co
m
m
is
si
on
. T
he
 
PS
As
 w
er
e 
ex
pa
nd
ed
 
pa
rtl
y 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
wi
th
 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t t
ha
t 
th
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
“
st
at
e-
of
-th
e-
ar
t” 
(i.e
. 
n
o
n
-p
ow
er
 p
la
nt
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
st
at
es
 a
nd
 
hu
m
an
 e
rro
rs
 o
f 
co
m
m
is
si
on
), a
nd
 
pa
rtl
y 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
lic
en
si
ng
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
o
n
go
in
g 
m
od
ific
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 (i.
e. 
an
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l I
m
pa
ct
 
As
se
ss
m
en
t h
ad
 to
 
in
cl
ud
e 
a 
Le
ve
l 3
 
PS
A)
.
N
o.
5
7
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 z
o
n
e
s
 (
E
P
Z
) 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e
 p
u
b
li
c
 
li
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 E
P
Z
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
e
v
e
n
t 
o
f 
ra
d
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 
fo
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
Sl
ov
ak
R
ep
ub
lic
Th
e 
EP
Z 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
m
ax
im
um
 s
iz
e 
of
 a
ny
 
ra
di
at
io
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
th
at
 c
an
 
be
 re
as
on
ab
ly 
fo
re
se
en
.
Th
e 
ha
za
rd
 a
re
a 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 a
 
ci
rc
le
 w
ith
 c
en
tre
 in
 th
e 
nu
cl
ea
r 
fa
cil
ity
 a
nd
 ra
di
us
 o
f 3
0 
km
 fo
r 
Bo
hu
ni
ce
 s
ite
, a
nd
 2
0 
km
 fo
r 
M
oc
ho
vc
e 
si
te
. I
n 
ca
se
 th
at
 th
e 
bo
un
da
ry
 d
em
ar
ca
tin
g 
th
e 
ha
za
rd
 a
re
a 
sh
al
l in
te
rfe
re
 w
ith
 
a
n
 in
ha
bi
te
d 
ar
ea
 th
en
 th
e 
w
ho
le
 in
ha
bi
te
d 
ar
ea
 is
 
co
n
si
de
re
d 
as
 a
 h
az
ar
d 
ar
ea
.
Th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
EP
Z 
fo
r 
Bo
hu
ni
ce
 N
PP
 a
nd
 M
oc
ho
vc
e 
N
PP
 is
 d
ue
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
de
ns
ity
, m
et
eo
ro
lo
gy
 
a
n
d 
ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
co
nd
itio
ns
. 
Ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l 
le
gi
sla
tio
n,
 o
pe
ra
to
r o
f 
n
u
cl
ea
r f
ac
ilit
y 
sh
al
l t
ak
e 
su
ch
 m
ea
su
re
s 
an
d 
st
ep
s 
a
s 
w
ill 
cr
ea
te
 p
re
co
nd
itio
ns
 
fo
r t
he
 p
re
ve
nt
io
n,
 
o
ve
rc
o
m
in
g 
or
 m
itig
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
a
cc
id
en
ts
, a
nd
 in
fo
rm
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
of
 s
uc
h 
st
ep
s 
an
d 
m
e
a
su
re
s.
 O
pe
ra
to
r h
as
 
pr
im
e 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
fo
r 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
of
 o
n-
sit
e 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
n;
 lo
ca
l 
a
u
th
or
iti
es
 h
av
e 
pr
im
e 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
fo
r 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
of
 o
ff-
sit
e 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
n 
wi
th
in
 
re
gi
on
s,
 d
ist
ric
ts
, a
nd
 
co
m
m
u
n
iti
es
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 
pu
bl
ic 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
A 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ac
cid
en
t h
as
 
be
en
 d
ef
in
ed
 fo
r n
uc
le
ar
 
fa
cil
itie
s 
on
 th
e 
sit
e 
bo
un
di
ng
 fo
r e
ac
h 
ty
pe
 o
f 
fa
cil
itie
s 
on
 th
e 
sit
e.
 F
or
 
e
xa
m
pl
e,
 fo
r t
he
 
W
W
ER
44
0/
V2
13
 n
uc
le
ar
 
po
we
r p
la
nt
s,
 th
e 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
e 
is 
de
fin
ed
 a
s 
a 
la
rg
e 
lo
ss
 o
f 
co
o
la
nt
 a
cc
id
en
t (l
arg
e 
LO
CA
). I
t le
ad
s t
o r
ap
id 
de
pr
es
su
ris
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
cir
cu
it 
wi
th
 c
or
e 
da
m
ag
e 
an
d 
re
ac
to
r 
pr
es
su
re
 v
es
se
l f
ai
lu
re
. 
Th
e 
ra
di
oa
ct
ive
 re
le
as
e 
fro
m
 th
is 
ev
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
tra
ns
la
te
d 
in
to
 q
ua
nt
itie
s 
o
f s
pe
cif
ic 
ra
di
oa
ct
ive
 
is
ot
op
es
.
Th
e 
fu
ll p
ow
er
 a
nd
 
sh
ut
do
wn
 L
ev
el
 2
 P
SA
 is
 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 fo
r u
ni
t 1
 o
f 
th
e 
Bo
hu
ni
ce
 V
-1
 N
PP
 
(2x
W
W
ER
44
0/V
23
0) 
an
d 
fo
r t
he
 u
ni
t 3
 o
f t
he
 
Bo
hu
ni
ce
 V
-2
 N
PP
 
(2x
W
W
ER
44
0/V
21
3).
Th
e 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 fo
r t
he
 
M
oc
ho
vc
e 
N
PP
 
(2x
W
W
ER
44
0/V
21
3) 
is 
u
n
de
r p
re
pa
ra
tio
n.
 L
ev
el
 
3 
PS
A 
st
ud
y 
ha
s 
no
t 
be
en
 p
re
pa
re
d 
ye
t, 
bu
t 
pa
rti
cu
la
r s
up
po
rti
ve
 
de
te
rm
in
ist
ic 
ra
di
ol
og
ica
l 
a
n
a
lys
es
 a
re
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
a
n
d 
do
cu
m
en
te
d 
in
 
se
pa
ra
te
 re
po
rts
 
(di
str
ibu
tio
n o
f ra
dio
ac
tiv
e 
m
a
te
ria
ls
 in
 th
e 
e
n
vi
ro
nm
en
t a
nd
 fo
od
 
ch
ai
ns
, a
nd
 c
al
cu
la
tio
n 
of
 
o
ffs
ite
 d
os
es
 in
 th
e 
ar
ea
s 
o
f n
uc
le
ar
 fa
cil
itie
s.
A 
ha
rm
on
is
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 a
nd
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 b
et
we
en
 th
e 
n
a
tio
na
l n
uc
le
ar
 
in
st
al
la
tio
ns
 is
 g
oi
ng
 
o
n
 in
 S
lo
va
kia
. T
hi
s 
pr
oc
es
s 
ta
ke
s 
in
to
 
a
cc
o
u
n
t c
ha
ng
es
 in
 
le
gi
sla
tio
n 
(E
U 
di
re
ct
ive
s,
 IA
EA
 
re
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
ns
,
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l g
oo
d 
pr
ac
tic
e,
 a
cc
id
en
t 
m
a
n
a
ge
m
en
t, 
st
at
e-
of
-
th
e-
ar
t m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
) 
a
s 
w
e
ll 
as
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
sa
fe
ty
 im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 
do
ne
 in
 la
st
 y
ea
rs
. 
R
es
ul
ts
 o
f L
ev
el
 2
 P
SA
 
w
ill 
be
 u
se
d 
in
 
id
en
tif
ica
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
m
o
st
 ri
sk
y 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
a
n
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 to
 
be
 a
pp
lie
d 
in
 th
e 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
ns
.
5
8
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 z
o
n
e
s
 (
E
P
Z
) 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e
 p
u
b
li
c
 
li
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 E
P
Z
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
e
v
e
n
t 
o
f 
ra
d
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 
P
S
A
 f
o
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
Sp
ai
n
Th
e 
de
fin
itio
n 
is 
in
clu
de
d 
in
 
th
e 
Ba
si
c 
N
uc
le
ar
 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
 a
nd
 it
 is
 
co
m
m
o
n
 to
 a
ll 
nu
cl
ea
r p
ow
er
 
pl
an
ts
. T
he
se
 z
on
es
 a
re
 
pr
ed
ef
in
ed
 in
 fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
di
st
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 n
uc
le
ar
 s
ite
 
(co
nc
en
tric
 zo
ne
s) 
an
d o
f th
e 
w
in
d 
di
re
ct
io
n 
(se
cto
r z
on
es
). 
Th
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
di
ffe
re
nt
 a
ct
io
ns
 
de
pe
nd
 o
n 
ea
ch
 z
on
e 
an
d 
th
e 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
sit
ua
tio
n.
 T
hi
s 
is
 re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
ca
te
go
ry
, e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 th
e 
In
te
rn
al
 E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
 a
nd
 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
Fi
na
l S
af
et
y 
As
se
ss
m
en
t R
ep
or
t.
Ba
si
ca
lly
, t
hi
s 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
s 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
at
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
89
/6
18
/E
UR
AT
O
M
 D
ire
ct
ive
 
a
n
d,
 tr
an
sf
er
re
d 
to
 th
e 
Sp
an
ish
 R
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 b
y 
th
e 
“
Ac
ue
rd
o 
de
l C
on
se
jo 
de
 
M
in
is
tro
s 
re
la
tiv
o 
a 
la
 
in
fo
rm
ac
ió
n 
de
l p
úb
lic
o 
so
br
e 
m
e
di
da
s 
de
 p
ro
te
cc
ió
n 
sa
n
ita
ria
 a
pl
ica
bl
es
 y
 s
ob
re
 
e
l c
om
po
rta
m
ie
nt
o 
a 
se
gu
ir 
e
n
 c
a
so
 d
e 
em
er
ge
nc
ia
 
ra
di
ol
og
ica
”. 
Th
is 
Re
gu
la
tio
n 
co
n
ta
in
s 
th
e 
m
in
im
um
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 b
e 
su
pp
lie
d 
to
 
a
ll 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 p
ub
lic
, 
be
fo
re
 a
nd
 d
ur
in
g 
an
 
Em
er
ge
nc
y.
 T
he
 p
ub
lic
 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 a
re
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 
fo
r i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
es
e 
a
ct
io
ns
.
Ac
co
rd
in
g 
wi
th
 th
e 
FS
AR
, 
th
e 
In
te
rn
al
 E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
 o
f e
ac
h 
nu
cle
ar
 p
la
nt
 
in
cl
ud
es
 th
e 
st
ar
tin
g 
e
ve
n
ts
 c
at
eg
or
ize
d 
fo
r t
he
 
po
ss
ib
le
 e
ffe
ct
s 
ov
er
 th
e 
m
e
m
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 p
ub
lic
 (in
 
fo
ur
 e
nv
el
op
ed
 g
ro
up
s).
 
Fo
r e
ac
h 
ca
te
go
ry
, i
t s
et
s 
o
u
t t
he
 p
os
sib
le
 
ra
di
ol
og
ica
l
co
n
se
qu
en
ce
s,
 a
nd
 it
 
pr
ed
ef
in
es
 th
e 
ac
tio
ns
 to
 
ca
rr
y 
ou
t. 
 
Th
e 
Ex
te
rn
al
 E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
“a
 p
rio
ri”
 
ra
di
ol
og
ica
l le
ve
ls 
fo
r 
a
ct
ua
tio
ns
, b
ut
 in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
, t
he
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 to
 c
ar
ry
 o
ut
 
ca
n
 b
e 
re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 c
at
eg
or
y 
de
fin
ed
 in
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
n.
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
ca
rr
yin
g 
ou
t f
or
 a
ll t
he
 
Sp
an
ish
 N
PP
s 
(2 
BW
R 
G
E-
de
sig
n,
 6
 P
W
R 
W
-
de
sig
n 
an
d 
1 
PW
R 
KW
U-
de
sig
n).
 Th
e 
a
n
a
lys
es
 in
clu
de
 
re
le
as
e 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
gr
ou
pe
d 
by
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 a
nd
 ti
m
e 
a
n
d 
us
in
g 
th
e 
LE
RF
 
co
n
ce
pt
 a
s 
th
e 
m
ai
n 
re
su
lt 
fo
r o
th
er
s 
PS
A 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. F
or
 th
e 
m
o
st
 re
le
va
nt
 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
so
ur
ce
 
te
rm
s 
ob
ta
in
ed
 fr
om
 
sp
ec
ific
 a
na
lys
es
.
Th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
Le
ve
l 2
 
PS
A 
fo
r s
hu
td
ow
n 
st
at
es
 y
et
. A
 p
ilo
t 
pr
oje
ct 
for
 tw
o 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
Pl
an
ts
 is
 
pl
an
ne
d 
to
 b
e 
do
ne
. 
Ex
te
rn
al
 e
ve
nt
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t a
na
lys
ed
 in
 th
e 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
.
N
o,
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
t a
t 
pr
es
en
t.
5
9
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 z
o
n
e
s
 (
E
P
Z
) 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e
 p
u
b
li
c
 
li
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 E
P
Z
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
e
v
e
n
t 
o
f 
ra
d
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 
fo
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
UK
Fo
r e
ac
h 
nu
cl
ea
r l
ic
en
se
d 
sit
e 
in
 th
e 
UK
 th
er
e 
is 
a 
de
fin
ed
 
zo
n
e
 a
ro
u
n
d 
th
e 
sit
e,
 th
e 
D
et
ai
le
d 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
Zo
ne
 (D
EP
Z)
, in
 w
hic
h t
he
 
a
rr
a
n
ge
m
en
ts
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
ar
e 
pl
an
ne
d 
in
 d
et
ai
l. 
Th
e 
bo
un
da
ry
 o
f t
hi
s 
zo
ne
 is
 
de
fin
ed
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
m
a
xi
m
um
 s
iz
e 
of
 a
ny
 ra
di
at
io
n 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 th
at
 c
an
 
re
a
so
n
a
bl
y 
be
 fo
re
se
en
 a
nd
 
ra
n
ge
s 
fro
m
 1
 to
 5
 k
m
. I
t i
s 
a
ls
o 
re
co
gn
ise
d 
th
at
 ra
di
at
io
n 
e
m
e
rg
en
cie
s 
co
ul
d 
oc
cu
r t
ha
t 
w
o
u
ld
 h
av
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 
be
yo
nd
 th
e 
DE
PZ
. T
he
 n
at
ur
e 
o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
se
 re
qu
ire
d 
is 
m
o
re
 d
iff
icu
lt 
to
 p
re
di
ct
 a
nd
 
w
ill 
de
pe
nd
 o
n 
a 
nu
m
be
r o
f 
fa
ct
or
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
o
f t
he
 re
le
as
e 
th
at
 o
cc
ur
re
d 
a
n
d 
pr
ev
ai
lin
g 
we
at
he
r 
co
n
di
tio
ns
. T
o 
de
al
 w
ith
 th
is,
 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t t
ha
t t
he
 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
ns
 in
co
rp
or
at
e 
a
rr
a
n
ge
m
en
ts
 fo
r 
“
e
xt
en
di
bi
lity
” b
ey
on
d 
th
e 
D
EP
Z.
If 
a 
ra
di
at
io
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
is 
re
a
so
n
a
bl
y 
fo
re
se
ea
bl
e,
 th
e 
pl
an
t o
pe
ra
to
r i
s 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 
pu
bl
ic 
in
 th
at
 a
re
a 
wi
th
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 th
e 
ac
tio
ns
 
th
at
 th
ey
 m
ay
 n
ee
d 
to
 ta
ke
. A
 
ra
di
at
io
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
is 
de
fin
ed
 a
s 
an
 e
ve
nt
 th
at
 is
 
lik
el
y 
to
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
ny
 m
em
be
r 
o
f t
he
 p
ub
lic
 re
ce
ivi
ng
 a
 d
os
e 
in
 e
xc
es
s 
of
 th
e 
sp
ec
ifie
d 
le
ve
ls
 –
 g
ive
n 
as
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
ive
 
do
se
 o
f 5
 m
Sv
, o
r a
n 
e
qu
iva
le
nt
 d
os
e 
of
 1
5 
m
Sv
 fo
r 
th
e 
le
ns
 o
f t
he
 e
ye
 o
r 5
0 
m
Sv
 
fo
r t
he
 s
kin
. T
he
re
 a
re
 th
e 
e
ffe
ct
ive
 d
os
es
 th
at
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a
cc
ru
e
d 
wi
th
in
 o
ne
 y
ea
r 
fo
llo
wi
ng
 th
e 
ra
di
at
io
n 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 w
ith
 n
o 
cr
ed
it 
be
in
g 
ta
ke
n 
fo
r h
ea
lth
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
co
un
te
rm
ea
su
re
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
st
ab
le
 io
di
ne
 ta
bl
et
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
fir
st
 2
4 
h 
fo
llo
wi
ng
 
th
e 
ra
di
at
io
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y.
 F
or
 
UK
 s
ite
s,
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
su
pp
lie
d 
to
 a
ll t
he
 m
em
be
rs
 
o
f t
he
 p
ub
lic
 in
sid
e 
th
e 
DE
PZ
. 
A 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ac
cid
en
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 d
ef
in
ed
 fo
r 
e
a
ch
 o
f t
he
 s
ite
s 
in
 th
e 
UK
. T
hi
s 
is 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
bo
un
di
ng
 
a
cc
id
en
t f
or
 th
e 
ty
pe
 o
f 
n
u
cl
ea
r p
ow
er
 p
la
nt
 o
n 
th
e 
si
te
. F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 
fo
r a
n 
Ad
va
nc
ed
 G
as
 
R
ea
ct
or
 (A
GR
), t
he
 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
e 
is 
de
fin
ed
 a
s 
a 
m
ajo
r 
fa
ilu
re
 o
f t
he
 c
oo
la
nt
 
ci
rc
ui
t l
ea
di
ng
 to
 a
 ra
pi
d 
de
pr
es
su
ris
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
cir
cu
it 
wi
th
 o
ne
 
o
f t
he
 c
ha
nn
el
s 
of
 th
e 
re
a
ct
or
 o
ve
rh
ea
tin
g 
an
d 
ca
tc
hi
ng
 fi
re
. T
he
 
re
le
as
e 
fro
m
 th
is 
ha
s 
be
en
 tr
an
sla
te
d 
in
to
 
qu
an
tit
ie
s 
of
 s
pe
cif
ic 
ra
di
oa
ct
ive
 is
ot
op
es
.
O
ne
 lic
en
se
e 
ha
s 
us
ed
 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 o
pt
im
ise
 th
e 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 p
la
nn
in
g 
a
rr
a
n
ge
m
en
ts
 u
sin
g 
a 
pr
ob
ab
ilis
tic
 a
pp
ro
ac
h.
A 
fu
ll s
co
pe
 L
ev
el
 3
 P
SA
 
ha
s 
be
en
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t f
or
 
th
e 
PW
R
 a
t S
ize
we
ll B
 
a
n
d 
th
is 
in
clu
de
s 
a 
de
ta
ile
d 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
. 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
s 
ha
ve
 a
lso
 
be
en
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t f
or
 a
ll 
th
e 
ga
s 
co
ol
ed
 re
ac
to
rs
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 a
im
 o
f t
he
 
a
n
a
lys
is 
ha
s 
be
en
 to
 
a
dd
re
ss
 th
e 
ac
cid
en
t 
fre
qu
en
cy
 c
rit
er
ia
 g
ive
n 
in
 th
e 
Sa
fe
ty
 
As
se
ss
m
en
t P
rin
ci
pl
es
 
(S
AP
s).
 Th
e m
os
t 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
es
 a
re
 
in
 D
os
e 
Ba
nd
 5
 w
hi
ch
 
gr
ou
ps
 th
e 
ac
cid
en
t 
se
qu
en
ce
s 
th
at
 w
ou
ld
 
gi
ve
 ri
se
 to
 a
n 
of
f-s
ite
 
do
se
 o
f >
 1
 S
v.
 A
lth
ou
gh
 
th
e 
an
al
ys
is 
ca
lcu
la
te
s 
th
e 
fre
qu
en
cie
s 
of
 th
e 
a
cc
id
en
t s
eq
ue
nc
es
 in
 
D
B5
, t
he
 w
or
k 
ha
s 
no
t 
be
en
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t t
o 
de
fin
e 
th
e 
so
ur
ce
 te
rm
s 
a
cc
u
ra
te
ly.
  
N
II 
ha
s 
be
en
 
ca
rr
yin
g 
ou
t 
re
se
a
rc
h 
to
 c
on
si
de
r 
ho
w
 th
e 
Le
ve
l 2
 P
SA
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
be
 
u
se
d 
in
 a
 s
ys
te
m
at
ic 
w
a
y 
fo
r e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
 p
ur
po
se
s.
6
0
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 z
o
n
e
s
 (
E
P
Z
) 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e
 p
u
b
li
c
 
li
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 E
P
Z
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
e
v
e
n
t 
o
f 
ra
d
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
B
a
s
is
 f
o
r 
th
e
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
S
ta
tu
s
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 
P
S
A
 f
o
r 
th
e
 N
P
P
s
 
F
u
tu
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 f
o
r 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
L
e
v
e
l 
2
 P
S
A
 r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
in
to
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
US
A
To
 fa
cil
ita
te
 a
 p
re
pl
an
ne
d 
st
ra
te
gy
 fo
r p
ro
te
ct
ive
 a
ct
io
ns
 
du
rin
g 
an
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y,
 th
er
e 
a
re
 tw
o 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
zo
n
e
s 
(E
PZ
s) 
aro
un
d e
ac
h 
n
u
cl
ea
r p
ow
er
 p
la
nt
:
1) 
Th
e 
pl
um
e 
ex
po
su
re
 
pa
th
wa
y 
EP
Z 
ha
s 
a 
ra
di
us
 o
f 
a
bo
ut
 1
0 
m
ile
s 
fro
m
 th
e 
re
a
ct
or
. P
re
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
ac
tio
ns
 in
clu
de
: 
sh
el
te
rin
g,
 e
va
cu
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 p
ot
as
siu
m
 io
di
de
 
w
he
re
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
.
2) 
Ing
es
tio
n E
xp
os
ur
e 
Pa
th
w
ay
 E
PZ
. I
t h
as
 a
 ra
di
us
 
o
f a
bo
ut
 5
0 
m
ile
s 
fro
m
 th
e 
re
a
ct
or
. P
re
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
ac
tio
ns
 in
clu
de
 a
 
ba
n 
of
 c
on
ta
m
in
at
ed
 fo
od
 
a
n
d 
wa
te
r.
St
at
e 
an
d 
lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
o
ffi
cia
ls 
ha
ve
 th
e 
ov
er
al
l 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
of
 d
ec
id
in
g 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ac
tio
ns
 fo
r t
he
 
pu
bl
ic 
du
rin
g 
a 
n
u
cl
ea
r p
ow
er
 
pl
an
t r
ad
io
lo
gi
ca
l e
m
er
ge
nc
y.
 
Th
ey
 a
re
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r 
n
o
tif
yin
g 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
to
 ta
ke
 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ac
tio
ns
, s
uc
h 
as
 
e
va
cu
a
tio
n,
 s
he
lte
rin
g 
or
 
ta
ki
ng
 o
f p
ot
as
siu
m
 io
di
de
 
pi
lls
. S
ta
te
 a
nd
 lo
ca
l o
ffi
cia
ls 
ba
se
 th
ei
r d
ec
isi
on
s 
on
 th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ac
tio
n 
re
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
ns
 b
y 
th
e 
n
u
cl
ea
r p
ow
er
 p
la
nt
 o
pe
ra
to
r 
a
n
d 
th
ei
r o
wn
 ra
di
ol
og
ica
l o
r 
he
al
th
 o
rg
an
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The USA Approach to Emergency Planning 
Since the early 1970s, there have been increasing efforts to determine severe 
accident risks more precisely and on a plant-specific basis in the USA. The 
first comprehensive plant-specific examination of risk was the Reactor Safety 
Study (RSS), WASH-1400 [42]. Later the RSS was updated and more 
complex and more intensive plant-specific risk studies were developed, both 
by NRC and the industry.
The most recent NRC studies of severe accident consequences are found in 
the NUREG-1150 analyses [41]. To date, about 40% of the 118 operating 
plants and plants under construction have had some level of plant-specific risk 
analysis reviewed by NRC. This body of knowledge was used in the prediction 
of environmental impacts of severe accidents for all plants. Both the frequency 
and magnitude of the source terms for such assessments were usually taken 
from the updated RSS. These source terms were then used with site-specific 
meteorological and demographic data to calculate off-site risk using the 
methodology of Level 3 PSA.
A separate set of source terms was provided for each of the two types of 
reactor designs, BWRs and PWRs. These same sets of data, without change, 
were used to evaluate off-site risks. As such, they do not represent plant-
specific analyses but are sufficient to illustrate the developed general 
magnitude and types of risks that may occur from reactor accidents. Once the 
source term data were established, all plants used the Calculation of Reactor 
Accident Consequences (CRAC) code to determine environmental 
consequences. Site-specific information regarding meteorology, population, 
and evacuation was used. Assumptions regarding exposure pathway, 
exposure limits, and plume behaviour remained largely unchanged for all 
analyses.
The NUREG-1150 study [41] is an NRC sponsored risk examination of five 
U.S. nuclear power plants. These analyses used state-of-the-art technology in 
evaluation of source-term release frequency, source-term characteristics, and 
consequence evaluation. Efforts were made to explore uncertainties in 
accident frequency, containment behaviour, and radioactive material release 
and transport so that from this distribution of results, mean values of risk could 
be determined. Source terms and frequencies specific to the plant were 
determined. Advanced computer codes were used. For example, the 
MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) computer code for 
consequence evaluation was used instead of CRAC.
The industry-sponsored risk assessments (e.g., Oconee 3, Seabrook, 
Millstone 3, etc.) are similar in that effort. They are made to reduce the degree 
of conservatism and to use the best information available. For these studies, 
source-term levels and frequencies specific to the plant are calculated [35].
Finally, studies exist that provide a detailed assessment of the risk due to 
specific types of accidents. For example, two such studies are NUREG-0440 
[43], which is a generic study of the radiological risks that could result from a 
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severe accident that releases significant contamination into the groundwater, 
and NUREG-0769 [44], which estimates the risks from direct contamination of 
the Great Lakes due to fallout from a severe accident at the Enrico Fermi 2 
power plant. These two as well as other specific risk studies are used provide 
information about the risk.
The Main Results of the Level 3 PSAs for the US Plants 
The risk from individual nuclear power plants is small. It represents only a 
small fraction of the risk to which the public is exposed from other sources. 
Even if the predicted early and latent fatalities from all 118 plants were 
considered (that is, the risk to the population of the United States from all 118 
nuclear power plants), this would only result in a predicted risk of 
approximately one additional early fatality per year and approximately 30 
additional latent fatalities per year, which is still a small fraction of the 
approximately 100,000 early and 500,000 latent cancer fatalities per year from 
other sources. Table B.1 presents the predicted early and latent fatalities and 
dose estimates per reactor-year (ry) for all sites in the USA (to be 
conservative, the upper-bounds, not the mean values are presented) [35].
Also the off-site severe accident costs for the area contaminated by the 
accident were calculated. The off-site costs that were considered relate to 
avoidance of adverse health effects and are categorized as follows:
x Evacuation costs;
x Value of crops contaminated and condemned
x Value of milk contaminated and condemned;
x Costs of decontamination of property where practical;
x Indirect costs resulting from the loss of use of property and incomes; 
derived there from (including interdiction to prevent human injury).
The severe accident analysis for the plants uses these five cost category 
models to estimate an average (annual) expected cost due to a severe 
accident. These costs are a sum of the costs for a range of accidents 
multiplied by the probability that each of the accidents will occur. For the 
plants that have severe accident analyses, estimated off-site accident costs 
could reach as high as $6 billion to $8 billion, but the probability of an accident 
with such high consequences would only be once in one million operating 
years. Higher costs are estimated for accidents with much lower probabilities. 
Projected costs of adverse health effects from deaths and illnesses would 
average about 10-20% of off-site mitigation costs. These costs are not 
considered in the economic cost calculations.
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Plant Total early 
fatalities/ry 
Total late 
fatalities/ry 
Predicted total 
dose
(person-rem/ry)x
Arkansas 3.3 x 10-3 1.7 x 10-2 238
Beaver Valley 2.5 x 10-2 1.3 x 10-1 1 720 
Bellefonte 4.0 x 10-3 1.0 x 10-1 1 335 
Big Rock Point 2.7 x 10-3 3.2 x 10-3 48
Braidwood 3.6 x 10-3 3.3 x 10-1 4 418 
Browns Ferry 4.3 x 10-3 9.7 x 10-2 1 446 
Brunswick 3.5 x 10-3 4.7 x 10-2 704
Byron 2.3 x 10-3 2.2 x 10-1 2 867 
Callaway 6.9 x 10-4 3.6 x 10-2 509
Calvert Cliffs 1.8 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-1 2 995 
Catawba 1.7 x 10-2 1.4 x 10-1 1 880 
Clinton 3.0 x 10-3 1.8 x 10-1 2 549 
Comanche Peak 2.3 x 10-3 3.3 x 10-2 466
Cooper 2.6 x 10-3 6.3 x 10-2 955
Crystal River 1.5 x 10-3 5.0 x 10-2 700
D. C. Cook 8.4 x 10-3 1.8 x 10-1 2 311 
Davis Besse 1.4 x 10-3 1.5 x 10-1 2 021 
Diablo Canyon 1.5 x 10-3 2.5 x 10-2 346
Dresden 4.6 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-1 1 991 
Duane Arnold 8.0 x 10-3 3.7 x 10-2 561
Farley 1.5 x 10-3 2.4 x 10-2 334
Fermi 2 6.8 x 10-3 1.9 x 10-1 2 722 
FitzPatrick 3.8 x 10-3 5.0 x 10-2 728
Fort Calhoun 1.7 x 10-3 8.0 x 10-3 111
Ginna 3.9 x 10-3 1.5 x 10-2 203
Grand Gulf 2.8 x 10-3 9.7 x 10-2 1 441 
Haddam Neck 1.2 x 10-2 2.0 x 10-1 2 618 
Hatch 2.6 x 10-3 5.7 x 10-2 855
Hope Creek 4.1 x 10-3 2.5 x 10-1 3 604 
Indian Point 6.5 x 10-2 7.7 x 10-1 9 727 
Kewanee 8.9 x 10-4 2.2 x 10-2 303
La Salle 3.6 x 10-3 2.0 x 10-1 2 898 
Limerick 1.1 x 10-2 3.1 x 10-1 4 461 
Maine Yankee 1.8 x 10-3 3.0 x 10-2 414
McGuire 1.0 x 10-2 1.4 x 10-1 1 806 
Millstone 2.5 x 10-2 3.1 x 10-1 3 988 
Monticello 4.1 x 10-3 5.0 x 10-2 730
Table B.1 Predicted early and latent fatalities and dose estimates per reactor-
year for all sites.
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Plant Total early 
fatalities/ry 
Total late 
fatalities/ry 
Predicted total 
dose
(person-rem/ry)x
Nine Mile Point 3.8 x 10-3 6.7 x 10-2 996
North Anna 9.4 x 10-4 1.1 x 10-1 1 496 
Oconee 1.1 x 10-2 1.0 x 10-1 1 311 
Oyster Creek 7.4 x 10-3 1.5 x 10-1 2 125 
Palisades 4.2 x 10-3 1.3 x 10-1 1 691 
Palo Verde 1.1 x 10-4 2.6 x 10-2 369
Peach Bottom 4.2 x 10-5 2.0 x 10-1 2 950 
Perry 6.9 x 10-3 1.7 x 10-1 2 544 
Pilgrim 3.7 x 10-3 6.0 x 10-2 873
Point Beach 2.5 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-2 309
Prairie Island 3.7 x 10-3 1.7 x 10-2 237
Quad Cities 4.5 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-1 1 588 
Rancho Seco 1.1 x 10-3 1.3 x 10-1 1 723 
River Bend 4.1 x 10-3 8.0 x 10-2 1 168 
Robinson 3.1 x 10-3 7.0 x 10-2 926
Salem 2.9 x 10-3 5.0 x 10-1 6 059 
San Onofre 1.1 x 10-2 2.4 x 10-1 3 099 
Seabrook 1.1 x 10-2 6.0 x 10-2 819
Sequoyah 6.6 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-1 1 474 
Shearon Harris 2.8 x 10-3 7.3 x 10-2 1 001 
South Texas 3.3 x 10-4 8.0 x 10-2 1 065 
Saint Lucie 3.2 x 10-2 8.0 x 10-2 1 063 
Shoreham 7.7 x 10-3 6.3 x 10-2 2 724 
Summer 1.3 x 10-3 1.0 x 10-1 1 381 
Surry 1.6 x 10-2 9.0 x 10-2 1 200 
Susquehanna 6.0 x 10-3 2.8 x 10-1 4 010 
Three Mile Island 2.8 x 10-2 3.3 x 10-1 4 381 
Trojan 3.7 x 10-2 1.5 x 10-1 1 971 
Turkey Point 6.0 x 10-2 2.0 x 10-2 278
Vermont Yankee 4.6 x 10-3 9.0 x 10-2 1 314 
Vogtle 1.6 x 10-4 7.3 x 10-2 983
WNP-2
b 2.3 x 10-3 4.3 x 10-2 649
Waterford 1.4 x 10-2 3.3 x 10-2 477
Watts Bar 1.8 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-1 1 540 
Wolf Creek 4.7 x 10-4 3.3 x 10-2 466
Yankee Rowe 3.3 x 10-3 6.7 x 10-2 872
Zion 5.6 x 10-2 1.8 x 10-1 2 379 
x Multiply person-rem by 0.01 to find person-sieverts 
Table B.1 Continuation.
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The HNP Level 3 PSA Study 
The main steps of the Level 3 PSA are illustrated on an example of the Edwin 
I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP), Units 1 and 2 [36]. The study was prepared 
within the license renewal process of the plant.
The offsite risk at the HNP is calculated using the PSA, which has the 
following major elements:
1. the Level 1 and 2 risk models, 
2. the Level 3 analyses performed to translate source terms and release 
frequencies from the Level 2 PSA model into offsite consequence 
measures.
The total CDF for internal events is 1.6E-5 per reactor year and the Large 
Early Release Frequency (LERF) is 2.7E-6/ry. The breakdown of CDF is 
provided in Table B.2. As shown in this table, the current analyses show that 
Loss of Feedwater events are a dominant contributor to CDF, followed by 
Loss of Station Battery A and Loss of Offsite Power.
The process used to extend the containment performance (Level 2) portion of 
the PSA to the offsite consequence assessment (Level 3). This included 
consideration of the source terms used to characterize fission product 
releases for each containment release mode and the major inputs and 
assumptions used in the offsite consequence analyses. The MAAP code was 
used to analyse postulated accidents and develop radiological source terms 
for each of the 15 bins into which the containment event tree end states had 
been grouped.
The point-estimate source term for dominant sequences was reviewed and 
found to either be in reasonable agreement with or higher than the NUREG-
1150 Peach Bottom NPP estimates for the closest corresponding release 
scenarios. The Level 3 analysis uses the MELCOR code, Version 1.12, to 
determine the offsite risk impacts on the surrounding environment and public. 
Inputs for the Level 3 analysis include the HNP core radionuclide inventory, 
the Level 2 release fractions, site meteorological data, projected population 
distribution for the year 2030, emergency response evacuation modelling, and 
economic data.
The estimated dose to the population within 80 km (50 miles) of the HNP site 
to be 0.035 person-Sv/y. Table B.3 shows the distribution of containment 
performance contributions to the population dose. It indicates that early 
containment failure releases dominate. The early release category includes 
Sequence 2, a station blackout event; Sequence 4, a loss of containment heat 
removal/drywell failure event; and Sequence 11, an ATWS with drywell failure 
event. The risk is dominated by Sequence 2 because it is estimated to result 
in a higher dose (0.019 person-Sv) and because it has a relatively high 
estimate for its probability of occurrence (1.79 x 10-6/y). The total early 
fatalities are 2.6 x 10-3/y and the total late fatalities 5.7 x 10-2/y.
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Initiating event 
Contribution to Total CDF
[%] 
Loss of Offsite Power 16.7
Loss of 600V AC Bus C 8.4
Loss of Feedwater 20.2
Loss of Station Battery A 18.0
Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure 7.3
Anticipated Transient Without Scram 
(ATWS)
4.3
Table B.2 The HNP core damage frequency profile.
Contributor
Contribution to 
Population Dose 
[%] 
Bypass 5.4
Early 91.2
Late 3.3
Intact (venting) <0.1
Table B.3 The containment failure profile.
Site-specific meteorological data was used processed from measurements 
taken hourly in 1997. These data were collected at the site meteorological 
tower. Hence, the meteorological data are applicable to the site.
The population distribution used as input to the analyses is based on the 1990 
sector population data for HNP. Transient populations were not considered 
because of the rural setting of HNP and the small assumed transient 
population within 80 km (50 miles) of the site. The site-specific growth rates 
for the period between 1990 and 2000, which were obtained from census 
information, were used to estimate a constant growth rate applicable out to 
2040 (population is expected to rise).
The evacuation modelling is based on a site specific evacuation study. In this 
study is assumed that 95% of the population within EPZ would start moving 
45 min after declaration of a General Emergency. The study also assumed 
that 5% of the population will not evacuate. This assumption is conservative 
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relative to the NUREG-1150, which assumes evacuation of 99.5% of the 
population within the EPZ.
Evacuation notification is assumed to take place at the times specified for 
declaring a general emergency. For Level 2 PSA sequence 4 this time is 
simultaneous to the predicted time for the core to be uncovered. For 
sequence 2 a general emergency is declared as the operators realize that 
they have a station blackout with no possibility of obtaining offsite or onsite 
power to restore decay-heat-removal systems. In sequence 11, an ATWS has 
occurred, the main steam isolation valve has closed and the standby safety 
system has failed to inject borated water into the reactor coolant system 
(RCS). A general emergency is declared based on a transient occurring with 
failure of a core shutdown system and containment failure is likely. In 
sequence 15, there are no water injection capabilities available. Core damage 
and vessel failure are unavoidable. A general emergency is declared when 
two of the three fission product boundaries (fuel cladding, reactor vessel and 
containment) have failed and the failure of the third boundary is likely.
Also the off-site severe accident costs for the area contaminated by the 
accident were calculated.
The methodology used to estimate the CDF and offsite consequences for 
HNP provides an acceptable basis for an assessment of risk reduction 
potential for candidate severe accident mitigating alternatives.
Uncertainties in the Risk Assessment 
Although substantial improvements have been made in the PSA methodology 
since, large uncertainties in the results of these analyses remain, including 
uncertainties associated with the likelihood of the accident sequences and 
containment failure modes leading to the release categories, the source terms 
for the release categories, and the estimates of environmental consequences. 
A comprehensive discussion of the uncertainties associated with risk 
assessments is provided in NUREG-1150 [41]. The relatively more important 
contributors to uncertainties in the results presented above are described 
here.
Probability of Accident Occurrence 
If the probability of a release category were to change by some percentage, 
the probabilities of various types of consequences from that release category 
would also change by the same percentage. Thus, an order of magnitude 
uncertainty in the probability of a release category would result in a 
corresponding order of magnitude uncertainty in the risks stemming from the 
release category. Uncertainties in the probabilities of the release categories 
are due to difficulties associated with the quantification of human error 
probabilities and to limitations in the database on failure rates of individual 
plant components and in the database on external events and their effects on 
plant systems, structures, and components that are used to calculate the 
69
probabilities. However, substantial programs to improve nuclear power plant 
safety have been implemented. These programs all served to reduce the 
average risk of the overall nuclear industry such that the use of RSS risk 
values and their associated frequencies of an accident (because they are 
embodied within the risk calculation) are reasonable upper estimates of risk 
for the industry. This is true for even those plants that have not had the benefit 
of a PSA analysis.
Quantity and Chemical Form of Radioactivity Released 
There are also significant uncertainties associated with the timing, quantity, 
and chemical form of each radio nuclide species that would be released from 
a reactor unit during a particular accident sequence. Radioactive material 
originates in the fuel and would be released from any damaged fuel during an 
accident. Depending on the accident sequence, such factors as attenuation in 
the reactor vessel, the rest of the cooling system, the containment, and 
adjacent buildings would influence both the magnitude and chemical form of 
radioactive releases. Information available in NUREG-1150 [41], and from the 
latest research activities sponsored by NRC and the industry indicates that the 
uncertainty in radio nuclide source terms is large and represents a significant 
contribution to the uncertainty in the absolute value of risk. In comparison with 
the RSS source terms, source terms in recent studies were in some instances 
higher and in other instances lower. However, for the early containment failure 
sequences, which have the greatest impact on risk, the RSS source terms 
appear to be larger than the mean values estimated from the recent work and 
are typically at the upper bound of the uncertainty range of estimates for 
NUREG-1150 [41].
Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling for the Radioactive Plume Transport 
Uncertainties are involved in modelling the atmospheric transport of 
radioactivity in gaseous and particulate states and the actual transport, 
diffusion, and deposition or fallout that would occur during an accident 
(including the effects of condensation and precipitation). The phenomenon of 
plume rise from heat associated with the atmospheric release, effects of 
precipitation on the plume, and fallout of particulate matter from the plume all 
have considerable impact on the magnitudes of early health consequences 
along with the distances from the reactors where these consequences would 
occur. These factors can result in overestimates or underestimates of both 
early and later effects (health and economic impacts).
Other areas that have effects on uncertainty are as follows:
x Duration, energy release, and in-plant radio nuclide decay time;
x Meteorological sampling scheme used;
x Emergency response effectiveness and warning time;
x Dose-conversion factors and dose-response relationships for early and 
latent health consequences;
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x Economic data and modelling.
The NUREG-1150 study [41] found that for the five plants studied, the fatality 
magnitudes (early and latent) were driven primarily by the core-damage 
frequency, the source term releases, site meteorology, population distribution, 
and the effectiveness of emergency response measures.
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APPENDIX  C 
______________________________________________________________
Call for Papers: Seminar on Emergency & Risk Zoning around 
NPP, 26 – 27 April 2005, EC DG - JRC/IE Petten, The Netherlands
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